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Theophilus of Alexandria and the Episcopal 
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Lecturer, University of Notre Dame, Sydney
& PhD Candidate, John Paul II Institute for Marriage and Family
Melbourne VIC
Abstract: Extant works show that Theophilus was fiercely opposed 
to the Origenism of the Tall Brothers and their fellow monks. 
These same works also demonstrate that he was a competent and 
orthodox theologian. In peculiar contrast to the written proof of 
Theophilus’ anti-Origenism, Theophilus ordained Synesius of 
Cyrene who had openly declared heterodox views. Norman Russell, 
in his work Theophilus of Alexandria, declares that Theophilus 
was willing to ordain Synesius and appoint him as bishop of 
the Pentapolis so long as Synesius kept these heretical opinions 
private. Given the unusual nature of his ordination, Synesius’ 
relationship with Theophilus thus offers a useful perspective on 
the character, leadership style, and theology of the Patriarch of 
Alexandria.
Synesius was a civic notable and Neo-Platonist philosopher of Cyrene.1 Born sometime around 370 and living until at least 413, Synesius was married at the hands of Theophilus of Alexandria 
and later consecrated as Bishop of Cyrene by the same man. Prior to his 
ordination, Synesius openly declared that he was unable to accept some of 
the teachings of the Church, particularly regarding the origin of the soul, 
1 Modern accounts of the life of Synesius can be found in Alan Cameron, Jac-
queline Long and Sherry Lee, Barbarians and Politics at the Court of Arcadius 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Jay Bregman, Synesius of 
Cyrene: Philosopher – Bishop (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1982); Maria Dzielska, Hypatia of Alexandria, trans. F. Lyra (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1996); Synésios de 
Cyrène, Hymnes, French translation, commentary, and establishment of Greek 
text by Christian Lacombrade (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2003) iii-xlix.
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the destruction of the world, and the resurrection of the body. Norman 
Russell, author of a recent work on Theophilus, claimed Theophilus was 
willing to ordain Synesius for the see of the Pentapolis on the proviso 
that Synesius kept his views on these matters to himself.2 Following 
his episcopal appointment Synesius showed himself to be an orthodox 
defender of the Christian Faith. C. J. de Vogel defines Synesius as one 
of those writers of the early Christian world “who endeavoured to give a 
rational and more or less philosophical account of their belief, and did so 
even without mentioning the name of the Person after whom Christians 
bear their name.”3 If de Vogel is correct in her categorising of Synesius – 
and we are not saying here that she is – and if Synesius held unorthodox 
beliefs, one must question as to whether it was prudent for Theophilus to 
ordain such a person given that the role of a bishop is first and foremost 
to proclaim the Gospel, a task which is impossible when one refuses to 
mention the name of Christ. Synesius’ ordination by the hand of Theophilus 
therefore raises significant questions regarding the character and behaviour 
of the latter, if indeed Synesius was both doctrinally suspect and reluctant 
to mention the name of Christ.
This paper seeks to determine whether Theophilus was right to 
ordain Synesius given that Synesius seems to have openly rejected some 
elements of Christian doctrine. His ordination is particularly problematic 
as Theophilus is widely known for his defence of orthodoxy, which showed 
itself particularly in his opposition to paganism, anthropomorphism, and 
Origenism. Theophilus was a strong and capable patriarch. His decisions 
were calculated and shaped by ideology and politics. We can confidently 
say then that the ordination of Synesius by Theophilus is not an empty 
event, but rather, a moment which reveals something of the character of 
Theophilus. 
The first section of this study will set out the three major 
concerns Theophilus faced as Patriarch of Alexandria – paganism, 
2 Norman Russell, Theophilus of Alexandria (London and New York: Routledge, 
2007) 27.
3 C. J. De Vogel, ‘Platonism and Christianity: A Mere Antagonism or a Profound 
Common Ground?’ Vigiliae Christianae 39 (1985) 1-62, 22.
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anthropomorphism, and Origenism. The second section will address the 
doctrinal objections Synesius outlined in his Epistle 105. This is important, 
as a simple reading of his doctrinal objections in this letter does not 
necessarily represent Synesius’ views faithfully. While it will become 
apparent that these objections are somewhat typical for Neo-Platonists, we 
shall also see that Synesius was occasionally innovative in his expression 
and interpretation of the Neo-Platonic principles underpinning these 
objections. Having given fuller account of Synesius’ objections, the third 
section will examine the writings of Theophilus to determine, where 
possible, Theophilus’ position on the intricacies of the three objections 
outlined by Synesius. Our conclusion will bring together the findings 
of the first and the third sections, in particular, to determine if the act 
of Theophilus ordaining Synesius is consistent with the actions he took 
against paganism, anthropomorphism, and Origenism.
Before beginning our analysis proper it is important to acknowledge 
some points in order to clarify the objectives of this study. Firstly, Synesius 
was educated by the well-known Neo-Platonist, Hypatia, and his works 
reveal clearly the influence this formation had on him. In all likelihood, the 
concerns of Synesius were not necessarily inspired by an affiliation with 
Origen’s writings; they could very plausibly be attributed to his formation 
in Hypatia’s Alexandrian school. Secondly, it would be unwise to try and 
claim that Synesius ever read Origen’s works. Such argumentation would 
be a novelty and an attempt to re-write Synesian history.4 Evidence in his 
own writings proves to some extent that Synesius had little exposure to 
the writings of the Christian Fathers or other church documents prior to 
his election.5 Finally, the object of this examination of Synesius’ three 
4 Indeed Jay Bregman is adamant that there is no evidence to suggest that Syn-
esius ever read Origen. Jay Bregman, ‘Synesius, the Hermetica and Gnosis’ 
in Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, eds R. T. Wallis and J. Bregman (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1992) 92.
5 A case in point is his acknowledgement in Epistle 67 that he has not studied 
the sacred laws for a long period of time as yet, given that a year previously he 
was not yet inscribed on the list of bishops. His reasoning then for not studying 
the laws of the church (understood to mean the canons of the Church), was his 
lack of time spent as a bishop. One can infer then that at the time of writing 
Epistle 105 he had not yet read the synodal documents countering Origenism. 
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doctrinal objections is not to determine if they are errors that Origen 
himself had made, but rather, if they were errors that Theophilus could 
have identified as inspired by Origen.6 Suffice to say that Theophilus may 
have misrepresented Origen at times and that his interpretation of Origen’s 
theology may not always have been justified.7
Challenges during Theophilus’ Ministry and his Relationship with 
Origen and Origenism
Theophilus faced a number of significant pastoral and theological issues 
during his time as Patriarch of Alexandria. His influence extended 
throughout Christendom through his involvement with synods and 
councils, his efforts to influence the appointment of bishops – most 
See Synésios de Cyrène, Epistle 67.27-29 in Correspondance – 2 vols, Greek 
text edited by Antonio Garzya, French translation and commentary by Denis 
Roques (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2003) 46 (= Syn., Ep. 67.27-29 (Roques 
188)). For further argumentation supporting the interpretation of these “sacred 
laws” as Church canons, see Cameron, Long and Lee, Barbarians and Politics 
at the Court of Arcadius 25-26. We should note that Denis Roques’ dating of 
the letter to January 412 must be called into question if Cameron et al. are 
correct in dating Synesius’ episcopal consecration as 411 (sometime after 
the reception of Theophilus’ paschal letter), as opposed to Roques’ dating of 
his consecration as January 1, 412. Perhaps it is of little consequence for us 
here; we may be certain that the letter was composed in the year following 
his consecration. Roques 187 fn.1.
6 Russell identifies that Theophilus particularly studied Origen’s De principiis, 
De oratione and De resurrectione prior to the publication of his Second Synodal 
Letter. Russell, Theophilus of Alexandria 24.
7 Russell argues exactly this case, recognising that it is probably right that mod-
ern readers should judge most of Theophilus’ accusations against Origen to 
be unjust. Russell, Theophilus of Alexandria 25. I tentatively concur with this 
view. On the one hand, a fair reading of the preface of De principiis alerts us to 
the fact that Origen recognises the speculative nature of his work, particularly 
as he lays out the limits of what can be determined directly from apostolic 
teaching. On the other, however, his belief that careful argumentation and cor-
rect method can lead to the construction of “one body of doctrine” suggests 
that Origen believed that his conclusions could be deemed dogma, not merely 
theological explorations. Origen, De principiis Preface 10:188-196 in Traité 
des Principes – Tome I, ed. Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti (Paris: Cerf, 
1978) 88 (= Orig., De princ. Pref. 10:188-196 (Crouzel 88)).
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significantly, that of John Chrysostom in Constantinople – and in his role 
as an expert in canon law, resolving ecclesiastical disputations.8 At a local 
level in particular, Theophilus was a powerful influence against paganism.9 
In the early 390’s, under the orders of Theophilus, the Serapeum was 
destroyed in Alexandria, promoting great dismay among pagans. Accounts 
of the event differ in details, but it seems sure that Theophilus sought 
justification for the destruction of the Serapeum from imperial laws which 
had been introduced to combat pagan worship. This is a classic case of the 
Church utilising imperial laws to achieve a theological end; in this case, 
the correction and conversion of Gentiles.10 Theophilus did write against 
paganism and idolatry, but it is clear that his most powerful preaching on 
8 Theophilus played a significant role in his region in resolving ecclesial disputes, 
particularly due to the fact that he was renowned as an expert in canon law. 
His expertise led to him being called upon by other bishops to mediate. For 
example, he was involved in resolving the issue of the recognition of clergy 
ordained by schismatic bishops during the Meletian schism in Antioch. Like-
wise he assisted in resolving a dispute regarding the succession of bishops in 
the see of Bostra in Arabia. Later Theophilus was called on to resolve signifi-
cant problems between Jerome and Bishop John of Jerusalem that had led to 
Jerome and his monks being excommunicated by John. Russell, Theophilus 
of Alexandria 13-17.
9 For a more detailed account of Theophilus’ fight against paganism see Elizabeth 
A. Clark, The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early 
Christian Debate (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992) 52-58, 
and Stephen Davis, The Early Coptic Papacy: The Egyptian Church and its 
Leadership in Late Antiquity (Cairo and New York: The American University 
in Cairo Press, 2004) 63-66.
10 There are, unfortunately, many contemporary examples of such misuse of im-
perial authority by Christians against pagans, Jews and heretics. For example, 
the suppression of pagan rioters in Calama in 408; the destruction of pagan 
shrines by Marcellus of Ancyra in 385; and Ambrose’s support for the perpe-
trators of a synagogue burning in the town of Callinicum in 388. Jill Harries, 
Law and Empire in Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999) 88-91, 95. Ambrose, Epistle LXXIIII (40), Sancti Ambrosii opera – Vol. 
LXXXII – Book 3, Latin text established by M. Zelzer (Vindobonae: Hoelder-
Pichler-Tempsky, 1982) 54-73.
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the subject came not in the form of words, but through deeds such as those 
related to the Serapeum incident.11
Another key concern for Theophilus was the propagation of 
anthropomorphism.12 His efforts combating this heresy led him directly 
into conflict with the desert monks of Nitria. The Nitrian monks took 
the view that “the immeasurable and simple substance of the Godhead 
possesses [human] contours and a human shape.”13 Theophilus opposed 
the monks on this point, labelling them “rustic and uncultivated” for 
holding such a belief.14 His position was entirely orthodox and acceptable 
in the post-Nicene era. A key objection to anthropomorphism was that 
attributing human features to God risked attributing to God human passions 
such as anger, forgetfulness and ignorance. Theophilus’ well-known 
contemporaries, the Cappadocian fathers, recognised this and opposed 
any anthropomorphic image of God. For instance, the Nyssan believed 
11 Clark identifies two homilies by Theophilus on these themes, one of which 
is of questionable authenticity. Clark, The Origenist Controversy 55 n.74, 56 
n.78.
12 Cassian records that the letter contained a long discourse that persuasively 
refuted the anthropomorphism, which had apparently become widespread 
throughout the Egyptian monasteries. Cassian, Conf. X, II, 2, John Cassian: 
The Conferences, translation and annotation by Boniface Ramsay (New York 
and Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1997) 371 (= Cassian, Conf. X, II, 2 (Ramsay 
371)). The anthropomorphic heresy maintained that God was human shaped. 
It developed from a misguided interpretation of the scriptural account of the 
creation of Adam and other passages from the Hebrew Scriptures which al-
luded to God’s physical features.
13 John Cassian, The Conferences X, V, 2 (Ramsay 374).
14 Defending his actions against the monks later in 403 AD, Theophilus wrote: 
“We have not only anathematized Origen’s heresies, but also another heresy 
that attempted to cause serious disturbance to the monasteries. Since certain 
people of the more rustic and uncultivated sort claimed that it was necessary 
to conceive of God in human form, we did not remain silent but also refuted 
this heresy, Christ having lent us vigilance, with written proofs in official 
ecclesiastical letters.” Theophilus, Letter written at Constantinople 7, Russell, 
Theophilus of Alexandria 141-42 (= Theo., Const. 7 (Russell 141-42)). Note 
that unless otherwise stated all future references to works by Theophilus come 
from Russell’s text.
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that, unlike His creatures, God is free from passions.15 Furthermore, he 
held that analogies and metaphors to describe God in human terms are 
always limited.16 For example, in his treatise against Eunomius, Gregory 
of Nyssa recognised that scriptural language utilised metaphors taken from 
human life such as fingers, arms and hands to “illustrate symbolically 
divine things.”17 These words, however, had both human and divine 
meanings.18 Taking for an example the word “Father,” Gregory claims that 
this human term “hides a distinction between the uttered meanings exactly 
proportionate to the difference existing between the subjects of this title.”19 
The reasons for this are apparent when one considers that God’s creatures 
(ontic beings) are subject to limit, including the limit of language which 
is used to describe them. God, on the other hand, is not subject to limit.20 
On Gregory’s view then, positive terms such as fingers, arms and hands 
must be understood metaphorically as “only the operations of God can be 
15 καὶ τίς οὕτως ἄθλιος ὥστε μηδὲ τὴν θείαν τε καὶ μακαρίαν φύσιν καθαρεύειν ἀπὸ τοῦ 
κατὰ τὸν φθόνον πάθους ὑπολογίζεσθαι. Gregory of Nyssa, Contra Eunomium 
I.418:21-23 in Gregorii Nysseni Opera – Vol. 1, ed. W. Jaeger (Lieden: E. J. 
Brill, 1960) 148 (= GrNyss, Eun. I.418 (Jaeger 148)).
16 “The Nature that has no boundaries cannot be accurately comprehended by 
means of the connotations of words. On the contrary, all the power of concepts 
[νοημάτων] and all the significance of words and names [ῥημάτων], even if they 
seem to have about them something grand and worthy of the Divine, cannot 
attain the nature of the Real itself. On the contrary, it is as if by certain traces 
and hints that our reason guesses at the Invisible; by way of some analogy [ἔκ 
τινος ἀναλογίας] based on the things it has comprehended, it forms a conjecture 
about the Incomprehensible.” Gregory of Nyssa, Homily 1:38.13-19 in Gregory 
of Nyssa: Homilies on the Song of Songs, trans. and intro. by Richard A. Norris, 
Jr (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012) 38-39.
17 These examples from human life are used πρὸς τὴν τῶν θείων δήλωσιν δι’ αἰνίγματος 
ὑπὸ τῆς γραφῆς μετενήνεκται. GrNyss, Eun. I.622:29-623:1 (Jaeger 205).
18 ὥσπερ τοίνυν ἕκαστον τούτων τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνως λέγεται καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνως 
σημαίνεται. GrNyss, Eun. I.623:1-3 (Jaeger 205-6).
19 οὕτω καὶ τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ὄνομα κἂν ὡσαύτως ἐπί τε τῆς ἡμετέρας καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς θείας λέγηται 
φύσεως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον τῆς διαφορᾶς τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ὑποκειμένων καὶ τὰ 
διὰ τῶν φωνῶν σημαινόμενα τὴν παραλλαγὴν ἔχει. GrNyss, Eun. I.623:2-6 (Jaeger 
206).
20 Paulos Mar Gregorios, Cosmic Man – The Divine Presence (New York: Paragon 
House, 1988) 95.
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spoken of in affirmative terms, but the being of God must be conceived 
only in negative terms.”21 It is therefore apparent that anthropomorphism 
threatened the transcendent nature of the Godhead as it purported to make 
claims as to its being. This was an unacceptable threat to orthodoxy. 
Theophilus’ most well-known attack on anthropomorphism was 
contained in his Paschal Letter of 399. Unfortunately this letter has been 
lost and one must rely on secondary evidence to determine its content. This 
letter, which John Cassian referred to in his Conferences,22 seems to have 
argued for God’s incorporeality in opposition to the anthropomorphic view 
of God which was held by many Nitrian monks.23 History has generally 
deemed the contents of this letter and his theology at the time of writing to 
be inspired by the writings of Origen. However, while Socrates and others 
attributed Theophilus’ preference for believing God to be incorporeal to 
the influence of Origen, Norman Russell argues that it was Athanasius 
rather than Origen who was the inspiration for Theophilus.24 While it 
is perhaps impossible to prove Russell’s thesis comprehensively, it is 
certainly worth noting that Socrates, Sozomen, and Palladius, each of 
whom included the Origenist controversy within their respective histories, 
were not sympathetic to Theophilus and would have tried to show that he 
21 Gregorios, Cosmic Man 222-23. We may likewise say that words “cannot say 
being, but can say the mode of being, even when it is outside of time.” Giulio 
Maspero, Trinity and Man: Gregory of Nyssa’s Ad Ablabium (Leiden, Boston: 
Koninklijke Brill NV, 2007) 105.
22 Cassian, Conf. X, II, 2 (Ramsay 371). We must, of course, be aware that John 
Cassian was associated with the Origenist monks during his time living in 
Egypt and perhaps also in Syria. Furthermore, we should note that he was 
reluctantly ordained deacon by Theophilus’ adversary John Chrysostom. These 
facts should warn us against placing too much emphasis on the details of this 
letter and the events it provoked. For chronological details of Cassian’s life 
see Steven D. Driver, John Cassian and the Reading of Egyptian Monastic 
Culture (New York: Routledge, 2002) 16.
23 According to Stephen Davis this Paschal Letter of 399 appears to have “re-
flected his indebtedness to the theology of Origen.” Davis, The Early Coptic 
Papacy 66.
24 Russell, Theophilus of Alexandria 22. 
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acted out of political, rather than theological, motives.25 There is no doubt 
that Theophilus was at times a divisive figure. This is beyond question 
when one considers such moments as his dispute with the Tall Brothers 
and the monks of Nitria, the disintegration of his relationship with his 
former confidant and ambassador Isidore, and the election and deposition 
of John Chrysostom. Given that it is not possible to map out adequately a 
truthful account of each of these episodes here it must suffice to say that 
one must consider the complex background of contemporary accounts of 
Theophilus’ theology before declaring that Theophilus was influenced by 
Origen at the time of writing his Paschal Letter in 399.
Further to this, it is not reasonable to accept uncritically as Socrates 
did that Theophilus was two-faced in his attitude towards the writings of 
Origen and Origenism generally. Socrates, who was hostile to Theophilus, 
claimed the bishop resumed his study of Origen after the controversy. 
Indeed Socrates purports that Theophilus declared
[t]he books of Origen resemble a field full of all sorts of flowers; if 
then I find in it something good, I take it, but if something appears 
to me full of thorns, I avoid it as something sharp.26 
In the absence of unbiased evidence, it is impossible to prove the veracity 
of Socrates’ claim. What is certain is that Theophilus’ relationship with the 
theology of Origen evolved over time. This evolution had three stages: the 
time leading up to, and culminating with the writing of the Paschal Letter 
of 399; the period of the Origenist controversy, which lasted from around 
25 “Socrates, Sozomen, and Palladius ... lead their readers to assume that theol-
ogy was not central to the debate, and the little of it that appears was served 
up by the bishop of Alexandria as a guise to further his ecclesiastical politics.” 
Furthermore, these three historians were clearly hostile to Theophilus and sided 
with “the theological opinions espoused by the suspected Origenists.” Clark, 
The Origenist Controversy 44.
26 Τὰ Ὠριγένους ἔοικε βιβλία λειμῶνι <πλήρει> πάντων ἀνθέων· εἴ τι οὖν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐφεύρω 
καλόν, τοῦτο δρέπομαι, εἰ δέ τι μοι ἀκανθῶδες φανείν, τοῦτο ὡς κεντοῦν ὑπερβαίνω. 
Socrates, Ecclesiastical History VI, 9, Socrate de Constantinople, Histoire 
Ecclésiastique – Livre IV-VI, Greek established by G. C. Hansen, French 
translation by P. Périchon and P. Maraval (Paris: Cerf, 2006) 334-35.
138
Theophilus of Alexandria and the Episcopal Ordination of Synesius of Cyrene
399 until perhaps 403;27 and the relatively quiet time which followed this 
up until his death on 15 October, 412. 
Over the period covering his election in 385 until the reception of 
his Paschal Letter in 399, there are too few extant documents to make a 
thorough analysis of Theophilus’ position with regard to Origenism. In 
the four fragments of Festal Letters dating from 386 to 395 which are 
translated by Norman Russell in his Theophilus of Alexandria, Theophilus 
gives no indication that he favoured or disapproved of Origen’s theology. 
Furthermore, these texts do not reveal any particular influence of Origen. 
In the fifth Festal Letter Theophilus outlines an orthodox Christology 
which stresses the incarnation of the “living Word” without diminishing 
His divinity:
Born of a virgin, he assumed a body in our likeness, appearing 
outwardly like us in the form of a servant (cf. Phil. 2:7), but proving 
by his works that he is the lord and creator of all things, since the 
works he performs are those of God.28
The sixth Festal Letter echoes the fifth, describing the “supreme artist” 
and “living and active Word of God” as “coming forth from a virgin as a 
human being,” accepting weak human nature.29 While the fifth and sixth 
Festal Letters expounded a sound Christology, the first and tenth Festal 
Letters provide a glimpse into Theophilus’ soteriology and Eucharistic 
theology. Echoing the Letter to the Hebrews and drawing an analogy 
between the Upper Room and the Holy of Holies, the Tenth Festal Letter 
describes Christ as annihilating the “typological practice of the High Priest” 
through the breaking down of the barrier between God and humanity. 
Prior to the Incarnation,
27 The end point of this period is somewhat difficult to determine with precision. 
One could argue that the heat went out of the Origenist controversy after the 
deposition and exile of John Chrysostom and the submission of the remaining 
Alexandrian monks (Eusebius and Euthymius) at the Synod of the Oak in 403.
28 Theophilus, Fifth Festal Letter in Russell, Theophilus of Alexandria 48 (= 
Theo., 5th Fest. (Russell 48)). Note that each festal letter will be abbreviated 
similarly.
29 Theo., 6th Fest. (Russell 48-49).
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…the High Priest alone entered into the Holy of Holies once a 
year, the people remaining outside because they lacked sufficient 
power. But the Saviour went in and gave leave for those who 
wish to enter.30
In the brief fragment of the first Festal Letter, Theophilus affirms that 
Christ gave himself up for the sake of humanity and left his very self for 
Christians who may “consume the whole of him as life.”31 
The second stage in Theophilus’ relationship with the theology 
of Origen, the period of the Origenist controversy, is comparatively well 
documented, with a number of letters – synodal, festal, personal, and 
otherwise – still in existence.32 In these letters Theophilus details what 
he believed to be the erroneous aspects of Origen’s theology. Among his 
many concerns with Origen’s work, Theophilus believed Origen held the 
following views on the soul and body: the nature of the soul and God are 
identical;33 souls came to be through the fall of rational intelligences;34 
souls pre-existed bodies and “were sent down to earth because of sins 
previously committed in heaven to be bound to bodies”;35 the created 
body is emptiness and the ruin of rational beings;36 resurrected bodies are 
corruptible, mortal, will dissolve into aether, and are spherical in shape;37 
30 Theo., 10th Fest. (Russell 49).
31 Theo., 1st Fest. (Russell 48).
32 Dates provided by Russell for documents referenced here relating to the 
Origenist controversy are: First Synodal Letter (late 399-early 400); Second 
Synodal Letter to the Bishops of Palestine and Cyprus (Autumn 400); Sixteenth 
Festal Letter (401); Seventeenth Festal Letter (402 AD); Letter written at Con-
stantinople (403); Nineteenth Festal Letter (404); Third Letter to Dissidents 
(currently undated). Russell, Theophilus of Alexandria 89-91.
33 Theo., 17th Fest. 14 (Russell 129).
34 Theo., 16th Fest. 17 (Russell 114); Theo., 17th Fest. 15 (Russell 129-30).
35 Theo., Third Letter to Dissidents (= 3rd Diss.) (Russell 101); Theo., 19th Fest. 
12 (Russell 154); Theo., Const. 9 (Russell 142-43).
36 Theo., 16th Fest. 18 (Russell 115); Theo., 19th Fest. 12 (Russell 153).
37 Theo., Second Synodal Letter to the Bishops of Palestine and Cyprus (= 2nd 
Syn.) 2 (Russell 94-95); Theo., 16th Fest. 13, 15 (Russell 110-13); Theo., Const. 
4, 5, 8 (Russell 139-42).
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and, souls reincarnate, will “be restored and will return to their original 
state.”38 A final point, regarding the creation of the world, Theophilus 
believed that Origen taught that God made only as many things as he was 
capable of conceiving and controlling.39 We will return to these matters 
at various times.
The third and final stage in Theophilus’ association with Origen’s 
theology from 403 till his death in 412 is really un-documented, save for 
some comments in secondary sources. This is unfortunate as this is the 
period in which Synesius was ordained by Theophilus. Despite this, our 
knowledge of Theophilus’ actions against Origenism during other stages of 
his life provides us with sufficient data for determining Theophilus’ anti-
Origenistic feelings during the height of the controversy. Hence, should 
we find that Synesius held Origenistic views, these feelings will be the 
standards by which to judge Theophilus’ perception of Synesius’ theology. 
Clarifying the Doctrinal Objections of Epistle 105
Some six months prior to his ordination, Synesius wrote an open letter 
(Epistle 105) to his brother Euoptius detailing his objections to accepting 
episcopal ordination. This letter was not only intended for the eyes of his 
brother, but for Theophilus and his advisors.40 Synesius begins the letter 
by outlining his concern that the priesthood will take him from philosophy. 
Furthermore, in his mind, he doubts his own strength to keep the divine 
flame alive within himself. Having mentioned these worries, Synesius 
goes on to explain the reason behind the writing of this letter – he does not 
wish to be accused later of having hidden his objections to his ordination 
38 Theo, 3rd Diss. (Russell 101); Theo., 16th Fest. 9 (Russell 107); Theo., 17th 
Fest. 11 (Russell 126).
39 Theo., 17th Fest. 17-18 (Russell 131-33).
40 Synesius finished Ep. 105 with the following command to his brother to 
inform Theophilus and the scholastikoi (advisors of Theophilus who were 
tasked with juridical duties) of the contents of this letter: “Apply yourself so 
that the lawyers [scholastikoi] are aware of this way of thinking and report it 
to the great Theophilus.” Syn., Ep. 105.143-45 (Roques 241). See also Peter 
Brown, Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire 
(Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1992) 138.
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from Theophilus and the scholastikoi who were tasked with advising 
him. Synesius continues, mentioning his desire to remain with his wife, 
who had been given to him by the Law and by the hand of Theophilus 
himself.41 What is more, he wishes that they may have many children in 
the future and that he would not want to sneak around like an adulterer to 
allow this to happen.42 At this point Synesius moves from more practical 
considerations to outline three doctrinal concerns that he believes must be 
accommodated if he is to accept the episcopacy. These doctrinal objections 
made by Synesius in Epistle 105 are as follows:
Indubitably, I will never want to believe that the soul is born after 
the body. I will refuse to admit that the world will perish along 
with all its parts. Regarding the Resurrection, which is a received 
opinion, I see in it a sacred and mysterious conception on which 
I am far from sharing the ideas of the masses.43
Let us now consider each objection carefully to determine what Synesius 
really believed. We will leave discussion of the first objection, which is 
41 Syn., Ep. 105.69-70 (Roques 238).
42 We may infer from Synesius’ letter that the current practice in the Alexandrian 
church was that sexual relations were forbidden for married bishops. Cochini, 
after extensive study of the manuscript tradition of the fourth century, affirms 
that bishops of both the East and West were called to practice continence at this 
time: “Let us conclude that the obligation demanded from married deacons, 
priests, and bishops to observe perfect continence with their wives is not, in 
the Church, the fruit of belated development, but on the contrary, in the full 
meaning of the term, an unwritten tradition of apostolic origin that, so far as 
we know, found its first canonical expression in the 4th century.” Christian 
Cochini, Apostolic Origins of Priestly Celibacy (San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1990) 439. Furthermore, Stickler raises the interesting case of Jerome, 
who “appealed to the praxis of the Churches of the East, of Egypt and of the 
Apostolic See, affirming that they all accepted only clerics who were virgins 
and continent or, if married, those who had renounced the use of marriage.” 
Jerome is perhaps our best source in the matter of Alexandrian practice in 
Synesius’ lifetime, as extant letters sent between he and Theophilus prove that 
the two men knew each other well. Alfons Maria Cardinal Stickler, The Case 
for Clerical Celibacy: Its Historical Development & Theological Foundations 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995) 60-61. See also Roques, 365 n.25.
43 Syn., Ep. 105.85-90 (Roques 239). Note that all direct quotes from the works 
of Synesius are my translations unless otherwise indicated.
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ostensibly a question of the pre-existence of the soul, until the end. This is 
primarily due to the fact that the question of the resurrection of the body 
is closely linked to the problem of the telos of the soul. Hence we will 
examine one after the other the telos and the archê of the soul, as discussion 
of the first will inform our understanding of the second. 
The Creation and Destruction of the World 
“I will refuse to admit that the world will perish along with all its parts.”44
At first glance Synesius seems to be concerned with the telos of 
the cosmos, though as we shall see, it is almost certain that his objection 
is related also to the archê of the cosmos.45 Indeed Neo-Platonists came 
to see that it was self-evident that “the concepts of an ungenerated world 
and an incorruptible world are interdependent and reciprocal”; that 
is, “[t]he former implies the latter and the latter implies the former.”46 
Porphyry, Plotinus’ biographer, believed that Christian belief in the 
creation and annihilation of the Cosmos in time was illogical, irrational, 
and blasphemous, and was therefore unacceptable.47 On his view, such 
beliefs imputed weakness or imperfection to the nature of God as they 
necessitated change in God’s immutable nature.48 Porphyry’s position is 
instructive for us, not only for the fact that he is the first interpreter of 
44 Τὸν κόσμον οὐ φήσω καὶ τἄλλα μέρη συνδιαφθείρεσθαι. Syn., Ep. 105.87-88 (Roques 
239).
45 In contradistinction, “the polemical target of the creatio ex nihilo was one 
or another Greek doctrine about the eternity of the world.” Jaroslav Pelikan, 
‘Creation and Causality in the History of Christian Thought’ The Journal of 
Religion 40 (Oct., 1960) 246-55, 250.
46 Niketas Siniossoglou, Plato and Theodoret: The Christian Appropriation of 
Platonic Philosophy and the Hellenic Intellectual Resistance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) 162-63. 
47 Christos Evangeliou, ‘Plotinus’s Anti-Gnostic Polemic and Porphyry’s Against 
the Christians’ in Neoplatonism and Gnosticism, eds R. T. Wallis and J. Breg-
man (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992) 123.
48 Evangeliou, ‘Plotinus’s Anti-Gnostic Polemic and Porphyry’s Against the 
Christians’ 123. R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London: Bristol Classical Press, 
2002) 102.
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Plotinus, but also because it is quite likely that it was a Porphyrian Neo-
Platonism that was taught in Hypatia’s school.49 Consequently we may 
assume that Synesius’ cosmology was inspired by Porphyry.50 We shall 
first consider Synesius’ cosmological views, drawing on the cosmology of 
Plotinus as interpreted by his disciple Porphyry. Having done this, we will 
be better able to determine whether Synesius’ objection was compatible 
with orthodox Christianity of the late fourth/early fifth century.
For both Neo-Platonists and Christians the question of the creation 
of the Cosmos raised a number of interconnected issues. Some of the 
more important were: Who or what created the Cosmos and how? From 
what was the Cosmos created? Was the Cosmos created in time or from 
eternity? Simply stated, confirmed in their belief in God’s role in creation, 
Christians developed the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo on the basis of both 
Scripture and philosophy in response to the second and third of these 
questions. While not expressed dogmatically until the thirteenth century,51 
the doctrine was substantially in place from the second century onwards.52
49 Note that Porphyrian Neo-Platonism is commonly contrasted with its Iambli-
chian counterpart. Bregman, Synesius of Cyrene 83.
50 We may feel confident of this, as there is significant evidence to support 
the argument that Synesius adopted (and adapted) Porphyry’s ‘telescoped’ 
triad of hyparxis, dynamis, nous as a model for his version of the Trinity. If 
Synesius has felt free to take on this important Porphyrian teaching, which is 
foundational to Porphyry’s cosmology, it is not surprising that he should be 
inspired to take on other aspects of Porphyry’s cosmology. Bregman, Synesius 
of Cyrene 82-83.
51 qui sua omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis, utramque de nihilo con-
didit creaturam, spiritualem et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam. 
Lateran Council IV, Constitutions 1:10-12, Norman P. Tanner, ed., Decrees of 
the Ecumenical Councils – Vol. 1 (London and Washington, D.C.: Sheed & 
Ward Ltd and Georgetown University Press, 1990) 230.
52 For the history of the doctrine and its scriptural, patristic and philosophical 
roots, see John D. Zizioulas, Lectures in Christian Dogmatics, ed. D. Knight 
(London and New York: T&T Clark, 2010) 83-88; M. C. Steenberg, Irenaeus 
on Creation: The Cosmic Christ and the Saga of Redemption (Leiden and 
Boston: Brill, 2008) 38-49; P. Copan and W. L. Craig, Creation out of Noth-
ing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic, 2004) 93-145; Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: The Doctrine 
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According to Plotinus, all of creation has its source in the One.53 
Plotinus explains the generation of multiplicity from the simplicity of 
the One through the process of emanation. The first Principle (archē)54 
generated from the One is Nous or Intellectual-Principle.55 Plotinus 
describes the generation of Nous:
…the One, perfect because it seeks nothing, has nothing, and needs 
nothing, overflows, as it were, and its superabundance makes 
something other than itself. This, when it has come into being, 
turns back upon the One and is filled, and becomes Intellect by 
looking towards it.56
So Nous comes to be through these two phases of procession (prohodos) 
and reversion (epistrophē). In the first instance, “a formless, infinite 
of ‘Creation out of Nothing’ in Early Christian Thought, trans. A. S. Worrall 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994) 154-56.
53 That is, the One is “the Source of all the “Reality” of all the “Being” in things.” 
John Herman Randall, Jr, ‘The Intelligible Universe of Plotinos’ Journal of 
the History of Ideas 30 (Jan.-Mar., 1969) 3-16, 14.
54 Note that for the most part I will use the term archē rather than hypostasis to 
describe the One, Intellectual-Principle, and the Soul. My motivation for doing 
this is threefold; firstly, consistency; secondly, Plotinus used the term hypos-
tasis in instances when he was not referring to any of these three entities; and 
thirdly, Plotinus himself preferred to use the word archē. Remes’ explanation 
(drawing on the work of Lloyd P. Gerson) is informative; the One, Intellect, 
and Soul are “(i) basic principles of explanation or fundamental explanatory 
categories; (ii) paradigms imitated by the lower levels and entities; and (iii) 
causes that actually generate everything there is.” Pauliina Remes, Neopla-
tonism (Stocksfield, U.K.: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2008) 48.
55 In his translation of the Enneads, MacKenna describes this second archē 
variously as: the Totality of the Divine Thoughts, the Intelligible Universe, or 
The Intelligibles. It should be noted that these examples are not an exhaustive 
list of the terms MacKenna uses to describe Nous. Plotinus, Enneads, trans. 
Stephen MacKenna (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1956) xxv.
56 Plotinus, Enneads V.2.1, trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1984) 59 (= Plot., 
Enneads V.2.1 (Armstrong 59)). Note, all references to the Enneads will be 
from the seven volumes of Armstrong’s edition unless otherwise indicated. 
Book numbers correspond to volume numbers except for Book VI.6-9 which 
is found in Volume VII.
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stream of life flows forth from the One,” and in the second, Nous “turns 
back, contemplates the One, and so receives form and order.”57 Plotinus 
contends that epistrophē establishes both Being and Nous and that this 
archē is therefore “simultaneously Intellectual-Principle and Being.”58
This process of prohodos and epistrophē is repeated as Nous 
becomes the source of the Soul, the third archē. 
This activity springing from the substance of Intellect is Soul, 
which comes to be this while Intellect abides unchanged: for 
Intellect too comes into being while that which is before it abides 
unchanged. But Soul does not abide unchanged when it produces: 
it is moved and so brings forth an image. It looks to its source and 
is filled, and going forth to another opposed movement generates 
its own image.59
We will return to the product of the Soul’s downward movement 
momentarily. Before we do, however, we should recognise the two 
actions which are common to each of the three archai. Each of these three 
principles (the One, Nous, and Soul) performs an internal action (energeia 
tēs ousias) followed – in a metaphysical, not chronological, sense – by an 
external action (energeia ek tēs ousias).60 For instance, the internal action 
57 Wallis, Neoplatonism 66.
58 “Its halt and turning towards the One constitutes being, its gaze upon the One, 
Intellect. Since it halts and turns towards the One that it may see, it becomes at 
once Intellect and being.” Plot., Enneads V.2.1 (Armstrong 59). Indeed nous 
is “eternal, true, and essential being.” Peter Manchester, ‘The Noetic Triad 
in Plotinus, Marius Victorinus, and Augustine’ in eds. Wallis and Bregman, 
Neoplatonism and Gnosticism 212. 
59 Plot., Enneads V.2.1 (Armstrong 61).
60 “In each and every thing there is an activity which belongs to substance and 
one which goes out from substance; and that which belongs to substance is the 
active actuality which is each particular thing, and the other activity derives 
from that first one, and must in everything be a consequence of it, different from 
the thing itself.” Plot., Enneads V.4.2 (Armstrong 147). Remes, Neoplatonism 
51, and Lloyd P. Gerson, ‘Plotinus’s Metaphysics: Emanation or Creation?’ 
The Review of Metaphysics 46 (Mar., 1993) 559-74, 566-70. A useful analogy 
for imagining these internal and external actions is that of a multi-tiered water 
fountain; the topmost tier must fill before flowing down to the next, and so 
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of Nous is its gazing upon the intelligible so that it may be perfected by 
it.61 The outward directed action of Nous which follows intellection is an 
outpouring which, in a sense, becomes Soul. Soul is comprised of two 
parts, the upward-looking Celestial Soul which contemplates Nous, and 
the Lower or Generative Soul which generates the material universe.62 
Soul is therefore the proximate cause of the Cosmos.63 
While modern Christian doctrine is clear regarding the material with 
which the cosmos is made – God freely created the world out of nothing 
– the issue was still contentious for both Christians and pagans in the 
early fifth century. Neo-Platonists believed that the Creator required some 
type of material with which to create the Cosmos. In the case of Plotinus, 
the external activity of the Soul generates this formless matter. Plotinus 
considers it to be “non-being” (mē on)64 or “the contrary of being” (ousia).65 
Here Plotinus has preferred the Platonic meaning of ousia as “intelligible 
being, the separate existence of the forms” to the Aristotelian notion of 
ousia as substance.66 Plotinus’ ‘non-being’ is therefore the negation of 
on. Christian Schäfer, ‘Matter in Plotinus’ Normative Ontology’ Phronesis 49 
(2004) 266-94, 271-72.
61 Plot., Enneads V.4.2 (Armstrong 145).
62 For an outline of how the Lower Soul creates in relation to the Ideas contained 
in the Intellectual-Principle, see Plot., Enneads II.1.5; II.3.17 (Armstrong 21-
23, 97-99).
63 The All-Soul is “the eternal cause of the existence, eternal existence, of the 
cosmos, or ‘WORLD’, or material or sense-grasped universe, which is the 
soul’s Act and emanation, image and ‘shadow’.” MacKenna, xxvi. It should 
be noted at this point that Plotinus and his followers often failed to delineate 
clearly between the archai when describing the cause of the Cosmos. Gerson 
addresses this problem adroitly in his attempt to determine if Plotinus’ account 
of creation is truly emanationist. He recognises that Plotinus posits ousia in 
Nous giving Nous an instrumental role in creation. As a consequence, Gerson 
prefers to not label Plotinus’ metaphysics emanationist or creationist as he sees 
that it is not compatible with Christian creationism nor is it strictly emanation-
ist. Gerson, ‘Plotinus’s Metaphysics: Emanation or Creation?’ 572-74.
64 Plot., Enneads III.6.7:12 (Armstrong 240).
65 Gerd van Riel, ‘Horizontalism or Verticalism? Proclus vs Plotinus on the 
Procession of Matter’ Phronesis 46 (May, 2001) 129-53, 129-30.
66 Riel, ‘Horizontalism or Verticalism?’ 130.
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intelligible being rather than substance. Matter, which is ‘non-being,’ is 
thus completely undetermined, lacking measure, limit, quality, form, and 
substance.67 Consequently, since matter is the contrary of substance and 
form, it is without quality and is evil.68 
The fact that Plotinus conceives matter to be ‘non-being’ is 
consistent with his emanationist cosmology. While both Intellect and Soul 
are established through the process of reversion, Plotinus contends that 
matter lacks this capacity of reversion towards Soul. Thus matter is unable 
to establish itself and cannot receive form. We may wonder then how matter 
can receive form at all – which it must do to some degree as experience 
proves it is at least fleetingly intelligible – given that it is reversion which 
establishes form in both the Intellect and Soul.69 Schäfer provides a good 
description of the means by which matter may be influenced by forms:
…amorphous matter, in its powerlessness, begs and bothers soul 
for the communication of form. But at the same time, matter is not 
able in any way to receive and to hold and contain form. Rather, 
[…] forms “come upon matter like a good dream […]” that seems 
to bring some order into it.70
This dream metaphor alludes to the fact that Plotinus gives material 
beings an ephemeral status. For him, the appearances of material objects 
67 Riel, ‘Horizontalism or Verticalism?’ 130. For Plotinus, substantiality is not 
dependent on matter. Rather, “by itself the form already satisfies the Aristotelian 
definition of primary substance,” thus the necessity of matter for constituting 
substance is negated. M. F. Wagner, ‘The Nature of Physical Reality’ in The 
Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. L. P. Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) 130-70, 135.
68 Plot., Enneads I.8.10 (Armstrong 305-6). D. O’Brien, ‘Matter and Evil’ in 
The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus 171-95, 176. We note that Schäfer 
disagrees with the traditional interpretation of Plotinus which declares matter 
to be evil. He writes, “[w]hen Plotinus calls matter evil, he does so metonymi-
cally denoting matter’s totally passive potentiality as perceived by the toiling 
soul trying to act upon it as a form-bringer.” C. Schäfer, ‘Matter in Plotinus’s 
Normative Ontology’ Phronesis 49 (2004) 266-94, 266.
69 Schäfer, ‘Matter in Plotinus’s Normative Ontology’ 272-73.
70 Schäfer, ‘Matter in Plotinus’s Normative Ontology’ 274.
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are deceiving and only apparent as the forms are not imprinted on matter, 
but rather remain within the Soul.71 
We see a similar view of matter in Synesius. An excellent example 
of this may be seen in Hymn I:
May the flow of serpents creep underground, 
may the winged serpent himself creep underground, 
demon of matter (δαίμων ὕλας), 
cloud of the soul (νεφέλα ψυχᾶς), 
friend of the phantoms (εἰδωλοχαρής).72
Lacombrade identifies the winged serpent with the Johannine serpent of 
the apocalypse.73 Additionally, Lacombrade correlates this image with 
the Pauline description of Satan in Ephesians 2:2, where the author refers 
to him as the “prince of the empire of the air.”74 It is not surprising that 
Synesius refers to Satan as the “demon of matter” given that his hymns are 
replete with negative images of matter. For example, elsewhere in Hymn 
I Synesius refers to the “darkness of matter”;75 the “black contamination 
of matter”;76 and the sorcery of matter enchaining him “by its artificial 
magic.”77 His reference to Satan as the “cloud of the soul” is even 
more interesting as it is a clear allusion to Synesius’ belief that matter 
somehow lacks substance and is an evanescent outpouring from the Soul. 
Lacombrade notes that the final image from this passage, the “friend of the 
phantoms,” is a common epithet in the Oracles and within the Synesian 
corpus.78 According to Lacombrade this epithet (εἰδωλοχαρής) characterises 
71 Plot., Enneads III.6.7 (Armstrong 239-43). Schäfer, ‘Matter in Plotinus’s 
Normative Ontology’ 275-76.
72 Synésios de Cyrène, Hymn I (III) 86-92 in Hymnes, French translation, com-
mentary, and establishment of Greek text by Christian Lacombrade (Paris: Les 
Belles Lettres, 2003) 47-48 (= Syn., Hymn I (III) 86-92 (Lacombrade 47-48)).
73 Lacombrade 48 n.1.
74 Lacombrade 48 n.1.
75 Syn., Hymn I (III) 264 (Lacombrade 51).
76 Syn., Hymn I (III) 550 (Lacombrade 57).
77 Syn., Hymn I (III) 575-76 (Lacombrade 57).
78 Lacombrade 48 n.2.
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“the insubstantiality of matter.”79 We can see then that the passage in its 
entirety presents an image of matter which is airy, illusory, and evil. This 
is of one accord with the Plotinian view of matter.
The thoughts of Gregory of Nyssa, Synesius’ near contemporary 
and fellow Christian Platonist, on the subject of matter offer a useful 
comparison to those of Plotinus and Synesius. Like Plotinus and 
Synesius, Gregory deemed matter “in its natural state” – which, to avoid 
a paradox, we must take to mean matter-in-potentiality or primal matter 
– to be formless and lacking all qualities.80 It is only in the converging of 
“intelligible concepts” such as lightness, heaviness, softness, hardness, 
etc. that matter comes to be in a concrete sense.81 This, Gregory posits, is 
the result of God exercising Divine Will to forcibly throw together these 
“intelligible concepts” to form material objects according to the dictates 
of Divine Reason.82 Such a theory of the creation of matter leaves Gregory 
open to the charge that his perception of matter is overly idealistic. We 
may note that in this respect his view is similar to that of Neo-Platonists 
like Synesius. Unlike Synesius, however, Gregory cannot declare matter 
to be evil as it is a product of God’s Divine Will.83 Indeed, a key point of 
difference between Neo-Platonic and Nyssenian thoughts on the subject of 
matter is the belief that the Logos is the principle of every created being, 
ordering and shaping it as an act of Divine Will.84
79 Lacombrade 48 n.2.
80 I am particularly indebted to Doru Costache for his help in identifying Gregory 
as a useful point of comparison with Synesius on the topic of matter. Doru 
Costache, ‘Making Sense of the World: Theology and Science in St Gregory 
of Nyssa’s An Apology for the Hexaemeron’ Phronema 28:1 (2013) 1-28, 20.
81 Costache, ‘Making Sense of the World’ 19-21. Costache provides here a trans-
lation and analysis of a key passage of Gregory’s In Hexaemeron in which he 
explains the formation of matter through the bringing together of intellectual 
concepts. Cf. Gregorios, Cosmic Man 104-8. Gregory of Nyssa, In Hexaemeron 
69C, in Migne, Patrologia Graeca 44. 
82 Costache, ‘Making Sense of the World’ 19-21.
83 Gregorios, Cosmic Man 108.
84 “We have to believe, therefore, that a certain wise and organising principle/
reason lies within each of the [created] beings.” Nyssa, In Hexaemeron 73A, 
translated in Costache, ‘Making Sense of the World’ 21.
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A final aspect of Synesius’ objection yet to be considered is the 
question of when the world was created. Central to this point is the 
distinction between the terms eternal (αἰώνιος) and perpetual (ἀΐδιος).85 
For Plotinus and his followers, eternity could only be ascribed to that 
which is; that is, that which is not in the process of becoming. In other 
words, this term could only be applied to that which is not subject to 
time. Perpetuity, on the other hand, could be ascribed to that which is not 
and cannot be; that is, that which is in the process of becoming. Now on 
Plotinus’ view, it was Soul which generated Time in the first stirrings of 
its generation of the Universe.86 What is more, Plotinus held that Time is 
the life or activity of Soul.87 The Neo-Platonists could therefore attribute 
eternity to the divine realm and perpetuity to the Cosmos.88 Furthermore, 
the Neo-Platonists believed “that God’s eternal actuality necessarily 
implies the perpetually renewed actuality of the world.”89 Hierocles of 
85 An excellent account of the history of the problem of distinguishing between 
perpetuity and eternity may be found in Niketas Siniossoglou, ‘Time, Perpetu-
ity and Eternity in Late Antique Platonism’ KronoScope 5 (2005) 213-35.
86 Plot., Enneads III.7.12 (Armstrong 345). This view was particularly informed 
by Plato’s Timaeus, which described the Divine Craftsman who had created 
the cosmos and then created time as a moving image of eternity. According 
to Plato, the Craftsman of the universe made the universe (ouranos) or world 
order (kosmos) based on a changeless and intelligible model, which is a Liv-
ing Thing that “contemplates within itself all intelligible living things.” Plato 
believed that the universe was not eternal as “it was the Living Thing’s nature 
to be eternal, but it isn’t possible to bestow eternity fully upon anything that 
is begotten.” To solve this problem, Plato envisaged that the good Craftsman 
created “a moving image of eternity” – time – thereby permitting the universe 
to exist perpetually in time. Plato, Timaeus, 28b, 29a, 30c, 37d, 41b in Plato: 
Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1997) 1235-36, 1241, 1244 (= Cooper 1235-36, 1241, 
1244). The Platonic cosmos was therefore co-existent with time and held in 
existence by a good creator, who would keep it in existence forever. Wallis, 
Neoplatonism 102.
87 Plot., Enneads III.7.12 (Armstrong 345).
88 Boethius is later to express the same view: following Plato, one must say that 
“God is eternal, the world perpetual.” Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, 
trans. and intro. by V. Watts (London: Penguin Books, 1999) 134.
89 Siniossoglou, ‘Time, Perpetuity and Eternity’ 221.
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Alexandria, echoing the view of Porphyry and his predecessors,90 argued 
for “the ad infinitum renewal of the universe”91 through an appeal to God’s 
immutability, eternal goodness, limitlessness, and omnipotence, and the 
order visible in the universe.92
Christian opinion on the questions of the temporal beginning of the 
cosmos and the possibility of its corruption differed from the Neo-Platonic 
one on a number of points. First, it is possible that Christians were unwilling 
or unable to accept the distinction between the eternity of the world and 
the perpetual renewal of the world.93 Second, the Christian response 
seemed to demand that God acted when previously He was inactive. This 
was contentious for the Neo-Platonists as it contradicted belief in God’s 
immutability. The response of Augustine and others was that time did not 
exist before God’s act of creation.94 In other words, time “began with the 
act of creation.”95 Consequently one needed to understand this ‘change’ 
in God in a metaphysical rather than temporal sense. A third point of 
difference concerned the generation of the world and the perishability of 
its parts – which is the explicit content of Synesius’ objection. The Neo-
Platonist Proclus, who was born around the time of Synesius’ death, put 
forward the axioms that “everything imperishable is ungenerated” and that 
“everything ungenerated is also incorruptible.”96 Hence, Proclus concluded 
that, as Plato declared the world to be imperishable, then 
90 Evangeliou, ‘Plotinus’s Anti-Gnostic Polemic and Porphyry’s Against the 
Christians’ 123.
91 Siniossoglou, ‘Time, Perpetuity and Eternity’ 218-19.
92 Hermann S. Schibli, Hierocles of Alexandria (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 64-65. 
93 Siniossoglou, ‘Time, Perpetuity and Eternity’ 218.
94 “If, therefore, there was no time before heaven and earth came to be, how can 
anyone ask what you were doing then? There was no such thing as “then” 
when there was no time.” Aug., Conf. XI.13.15 (Boulding 231-32).
95 Pacioni, Augustine of Hippo 185.
96 Siniossoglou, ‘Time, Perpetuity and Eternity’ 223.
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…if the World is incorruptible and if nothing that was created in 
time is incorruptible [= everything created in time is corruptible], 
then the world is without a temporal beginning.97
Some Christians interpreted these axioms differently. For instance, in 
the early sixth century both Zacharias and Philoponus took these axioms 
to mean that “everything imperishable is ungenerated” and everything 
perishable – including the world – must be generated as it is composed 
of perishable parts.98 
While various conflicts sharpened Orthodox views on the eternity 
of the world in later years, Christian doctrine on the matter was well 
developed by the late fourth century.99 This was certainly true regarding 
both the belief that Creation’s longevity is dependent on God’s Will and 
the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo.100 With this in mind, one cannot rule out 
the possibility that Synesius held some heterodox views regarding the 
creation and dissolution of the world, remembering of course that to declare 
him heterodox would demand proof that the Orthodox position was fully 
developed at the time. We may conclude by recognising that, like Proclus, 
Synesius was influenced by the Neo-Platonic belief that the Cosmos was 
ungenerated and that its parts are incorruptible. Furthermore, Synesius’ 
negative view of matter betrays his tendency to view the material world as 
97 Siniossoglou, ‘Time, Perpetuity and Eternity’ 223.
98 Siniossoglou, ‘Time, Perpetuity and Eternity’ 223-24. Siniossoglou also as-
sumes this view was held by Basil, Gregory of Nyssa and the 3rd-4th Century 
Christian Lactantius.
99 For example, in 529 “John Philoponus, an Alexandrian Christian and mem-
ber of the Neoplatonist school of Alexandria, responded to Proclus’ eighteen 
arguments against a beginning of the cosmos (De aetnitate [sic] mundi contra 
christianos, a lost work) with his De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum. All of 
this indicates that despite the grand effort of St Basil the Great, St Ambrose, 
and St Augustine, the temporal beginning of the world was still an issue for 
Christians engaged in classical learning.” T. T. Tollefsen, Activity and Par-
ticipation in Late Antique and Early Christian Thought (New York: Oxford 
University Press Inc., 2012) 118.
100 For more on the complex issues of contingency and Divine Will in Plotinian 
metaphysics and Christian theology, see Gerson’s persuasive article, ‘Plotinus’s 
Metaphysics: Emanation or Creation?’ 559-74.
153
Phronema Volume 29(2), 2014
a privation and a mere image of the Soul. So while Synesius’ cosmology 
is thoroughly pagan in these regards, it is not certain that they would have 
been considered heterodox at the time.
The Resurrection of the Body
“Regarding the Resurrection, which is a received opinion, I see in it a 
sacred and mysterious conception on which I am far from sharing the 
ideas of the masses.”101
There are two key aspects to consider in relation to this objection. 
Not only does Synesius disagree with common beliefs regarding the 
Resurrection, but we also find that he is unwilling to share his personal 
views on the doctrine with the masses. Synesius follows the aforementioned 
objection with a passionate argument for protecting the unlearned from 
mysteries that are beyond them.102 On this point we should note that 
Origen took the same view regarding the Resurrection.103 In fact arguments 
for shielding the uneducated from profound philosophical, religious, 
or theological doctrines can be found in both Hellenic and Christian 
traditions.104 Synesius’ position, which was founded on his formation as 
101 τὴν καθωμιλημένην ἀνάστασιν ἱερόν τι καὶ ἀπόρρητον ἤγημαι καὶ πολλοῦ δέω ταῖς τοῦ 
πλήθους ὑπολήψεσιν ὁμολογῆσαι. Syn., Ep. 105.89-90 (Roques 239).
102 Syn., Ep. 105.90-108 (Roques 239).
103 While we do not claim that Origen directly influenced Synesius in this mat-
ter, it is curious that Synesius shares with Origen a disinclination to share on 
the Resurrection. In an attempt to account for the obscurity of 1 Corinthians 
15:48-49, a key passage for understanding Paul’s teaching on the resurrec-
tion of the dead, Origen gives a key for preaching about divine mysteries. 
Quoting the Apostle he begins: “‘Behold, I tell you a mystery.’ This word is 
usually applied to the deeper and more mystical doctrines which are rightly 
concealed from the multitude. Thus it is also written in Tobit, ‘it is good to 
hide a king’s mystery’; but with reference to that which is glorious and suitable 
for the multitude it goes on ‘it is good to reveal the works of God gloriously’, 
the truth being expressed by terms which are on their level.” Origen, Contra 
Celsum 5.19, trans. and ed. by Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: University of 
Cambridge, 1980) 278-79.
104 Rahner gives examples from the Hellenic tradition, particularly in the Orphic 
sayings, the Corpus Hermeticum, and later Pythagoreanism. Hugo Rahner, 
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a Hellenised philosopher, no doubt dovetailed neatly with the Christian 
customs of reserve and the disciplina arcana. Synesius’ works reveal that 
he was firm and consistent in his opposition to sharing on mysteries, be they 
of a Christian or pagan nature. For instance, he was unwilling to commit 
discussion of the mysteries of the Godhead to writing.105 Elsewhere he 
censured his friend Herculian for divulging philosophical secrets to those 
who had not worked to acquire them.106 While it is not possible to discern 
Synesius’ primary motivation for refusing to speak of the mysteries of the 
Resurrection with the masses it seems quite certain that Synesius would 
Greek Myths and Christian Mystery (New York: Biblo & Tannen Booksellers 
and Publishers, Inc., 1971) 38-39.
105 For example, in Hymn I (III) Synesius clearly declares discussion on the inner 
life of the Godhead to be forbidden:
 Regarding that which is prior to Being (προούσιον)
 it is not permitted to speak, of this second issue from you;
 it is not permissible to speak of the third, issue from the first. 
 Syn., Hymn I (III) 220-30 (Lacombrade 50). This is, of course, a very Neo-
Platonic way of describing the Godhead. A second example, from Hymn IX 
(I), is more revealing as it occurs in the context of a discourse on the Trinity:
 Stop, audacious lyre, stop, do not reveal the mysteries
 To the crowds of the non-initiated. Go, sing the things 
 Below and let those above remain shrouded in silence.
 Syn., Hymn IX (I) 71-73 (Lacombrade 102-3).
106 See in particular Epistle 143, addressed to his friend and fellow student 
Herculian, where Synesius sternly reminds Herculian to guard carefully the 
philosophical mysteries from the uninitiated. Syn., Ep. 143.32-3 (Roques 286). 
As a means for instructing Herculian on the reasons for keeping the mysteries 
from the mob, Synesius refers Herculian to a letter written from the Pythago-
rean Lysis to a certain Hipparchus. This letter warns against the disclosing of 
Pythagoras’ doctrines to the masses: “[I]t is nothing less than a sacred duty to 
guard his divine precepts, and to communicate none of the treasures of philoso-
phy to those who have not been regenerated by purification of the spirit. It is 
not fit to hand over to them what we have achieved with such great effort. Just 
as it is not permitted to divulge the arcana of the Goddesses at Eleusis to the 
profane, those who do the one or the other must be held equally impious and 
sinful.” As quoted by Copernicus in the Dedication of De Revolutionibus. For 
a partial translation of the letter, see Thomas W. Africa, ‘Copernicus’ Relation 
to Aristarchus and Pythagoras’ Isis 52 (Sep., 1961) 403-9, 407.
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not have insisted on speaking ‘mythologically’ to the mob in Epistle 105 
if he believed his position to be Christian.107 
Returning to consideration of Synesius’ personal beliefs regarding 
the doctrine of the Resurrection we must accept that Synesius offers little 
on which to base our study. He does, however, provide a solid account of 
his attitude towards matter, his theory of the pneumatic soul-vehicle, and 
the process by which the soul may ascend to the heavenly realm. Taken 
together these elements allow us to construct the foundation on which 
Synesius would have developed his thoughts on the Christian doctrine of 
bodily resurrection. Synesius is notoriously pessimistic in his disposition 
towards matter (hylē). We have seen already that in Hymn I Synesius 
refers to the “darkness of matter;”108 the “demons of matter;”109 the “black 
contamination of matter;”110 and the sorcery of matter enchaining him “by 
its artificial magic.”111 Such a disposition towards matter is standard in 
Neo-Platonism, stemming as it does from matter’s lowly position in the 
hierarchy of being.112 Matter is not regarded by Synesius, however, as “an 
anti-god” opposed to a good creating God.113 Rather, it is deemed to be a 
demonic nature whose action is limited to the world here below.114 With 
such a view of matter, we must ask how Synesius could even entertain 
the possibility that the body could survive death. 
107 τὰ μὲν οἴκοι φιλοσοφῶ, τὰ δ’ ἔξω φιλόμυθός εἰμι διδάσκων. Syn., Ep. 105.90-108 
(Roques 239).
108 Syn., Hymn I (III) 264 (Lacombrade 51).
109 Syn., Hymn I (III) 541 (Lacombrade 57).
110 Syn., Hymn I (III) 550 (Lacombrade 57).
111 Syn., Hymn I (III) 575-76 (Lacombrade 57).
112 Noël Aujoulat recognised this as an ongoing concern for Plato and his followers, 
“Cette recherche d’un intermédiaire entre deux états aussi différents que la 
matière et l’esprit avait été une préoccupation constante de Platon et de ses 
fidèles.” Synésios de Cyrène, Opuscules I, Greek text established by Jaques 
Lamoureux, French translation and commentary by Noël Aujoulat (Paris: Les 
Belles Lettres, 2004) 215 (= Syn., De Insom. (Aujoulat 215)).
113 Lacombrade 40-41.
114 Lacombrade 40-41. Synesius writes of the demon, or demons, of matter (δαίμων 
ὕλας) in Hymn I (III) and II (IV). Syn., Hymn I (III) 90; 541 (Lacombrade 48; 
57) and Syn., Hymn II (IV) 258 (Lacombrade 66).
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Hymn IV (VI), in its use of the word pneuma, provides a clue to 
answering this question. This Christological hymn, while not strictly 
orthodox, describes the Son dividing his breath (pneuma) “around the 
earth,” reuniting “once more at the source this that the source has given, 
in delivering mortals from the necessity of death.”115 Here pneuma has the 
characteristics of having a divine origin, being shared among individuals, 
and reuniting mortals at the end of their earthly sojourns. De insomniis 
takes up this concept of the divine pneuma and lays out a fairly standard 
Neo-Platonic analysis of the pneumatic soul-vehicle (ochema-pneuma). 
The theory of the soul-vehicle was key to understanding how the Neo-
Platonist could account both for meaningful interaction between the 
immaterial soul and material body, and thus for the resurrection of the 
body.116 The theory of the soul-vehicle, or ochema-pneuma, can be found 
in the Chaldean Oracles, the Corpus Hermeticum, and the writings of 
both Christian and pagan Neo-Platonists.117 Its origins are found in both 
the Platonic and Aristotelian corpus.118
115 Syn., Hymn IV (VI) 21-23 (Lacombrade 75).
116 Bregman makes the poignant observation, that “[a]ny doctrine which dealt 
with contact between nous and the material world had to be somehow under-
stood immaterially by a philosopher” such as Synesius. Hence, the doctrine 
of the soul-vehicle is an attempt to attribute to an immaterial entity (i.e. the 
soul vehicle) the role of intermediary between the purely spiritual soul and 
the material world. Bregman, Synesius of Cyrene 160-61. 
117 Bos notes that along with Origen, “the doctrine of the soul-vehicle is also 
found in Porphyry, Iamblichus, Syrianus, Hierocles, Augustine, Boethius, 
Philoponus, Macrobius, and Synesius.” Abraham P. Bos, ‘‘Aristotelian’ and 
‘Platonic’ Dualism in Hellenistic and Early Christian Philosophy and in 
Gnosticism’ Vigiliae Christianae 56:3 (Aug, 2002) 273-91, 274. Schibli goes 
further, identifying the doctrine in the Chaldean Oracles, Origen, Didymus of 
Alexandria, Proclus, Hermias, Aeneas of Gaza, Simplicius, Damascius, and 
Olympiodorus. Hermann S. Schibli, Hierocles of Alexandria (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) 98-99.
118 A reasonably comprehensive history of the doctrine of the ochema-pneuma may 
be found in Dodds’ essay on the Neoplatonic astral body. E. R. Dodds, ‘The 
Astral Body in Neoplatonism’ in Proclus, The Elements of Theology, transla-
tion, introduction and commentary by E. R. Dodds (Oxford: The Clarendon 
Press, 1964) 313-21. Dodds draws extensively on the very useful work of 
Robert Christian Kissling, ‘The Oxhma-PNEUMA of the Neo-Platonists and 
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The Platonic roots of the doctrine are varied. For example, 
commentators on Phaedrus 246-47 came to interpret the analogy of the 
soul to a team of horses and their charioteer as confirmation that the soul 
was carried to and from the celestial realm and through life in some sort of 
chariot or vehicle. Elsewhere, in Timaeus 41e, Plato describes the mythical 
mounting of individual created souls in stars, installed as if on a vehicle 
(ochema) in order to discover the nature of the universe.119 To these two 
examples we may add a reference in Phaedo 113d to vessels (ochemata) 
provided for the dead.120 For later Platonists, the soul-vehicle came to 
be understood as that vessel which carried the soul in its journey from 
the noetic realm to the material world.121 This vehicle was not simply an 
insensitive envelope or sheath. Rather, the descent of the ochema into the 
world entailed its interaction with matter, which was liable to weigh down 
the soul in its chariot and bind it to mundane concerns. The Aristotelian 
tradition contributed the notion of the pneuma, the “warm, airy substance 
transmitted by semen in the procreative act and serving as the locus of the 
nutritive, sensitive and imaginative soul.”122 This seminal substance was 
held by Aristotle to be “analogous to the element which belongs to the 
stars.”123 Adapting the Aristotelian concept, the Stoics came to teach that 
“the soul was a hot πνεῦμα, composed of fire and air” which served as the 
seat of “sensation, imagination and reasoning” in the human person.124 
By the end of the third century AD the Platonic ochema came to be 
amalgamated with the Aristotelian-Stoic pneuma. While the soul-vehicle 
the De Insomniis of Synesius of Cyrene’ The American Journal of Philology 
43:4 (1922) 318-30.
119 Plato, Timaeus 41e, Platone – Tutte le opere, ed. Enrico V. Maltese (Roma: 
Grandi Tascabili Economici/Newton, 2010) 2220.
120 Plato, Phaedo 113d, Platone – Tutte le opere 216.
121 John F. Finamore, Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul (Chico, 
California: Scholars Press, 1985) 1.
122 Schibli, Hierocles of Alexandria 98. Kissling, ‘The Oxhma-PNEUMA of the 
Neo-Platonists’ 319.
123 Aristotle, Generation of Animals, The Loeb Classical Library, ed. A. L. Peck 
(London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1943) 171 [736b36-737a1].
124 Schibli, Hierocles of Alexandria 98.
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was fairly standard Neo-Platonic doctrine by this time, terminology to 
describe it was not fixed. Hermann S. Schibli notes, for instance, that the 
soul-vehicle was “variously described as ‘luminous’ (αὐγοειδές), ‘astral’ 
(ἀστροειδές), ‘ethereal’ (αἰθεριῶδες/αἰθέριον), ‘congenital’ (συμφυές), or 
‘pneumatic’ (πνευματικόν).”125 Variety in the terminology to describe the 
vehicle was indicative of the origins of the doctrine and the particular 
concerns and influences of the individual philosopher.
The theory of the ochema-pneuma makes possible interaction 
between the purely divine and immaterial soul, and the world of matter.126 
What is more, the theory opens the path for developing a plausible 
explanation for the Christian doctrine of bodily resurrection. For Synesius, 
the ochema is the mobile aspect of the spiritual body.127 The soul borrows 
the ochema from the spheres so that it may act as an intermediary between 
matter and soul, bearing the soul on its journey to the world below.128 
Enclosing the soul like an oyster shell, the imaginative pneuma is imprinted 
with impressions projected onto it through its interaction with matter.129 
125 Schibli, Hierocles of Alexandria 99. We shall see that Synesius too was not 
consistent in his vocabulary when referring to the soul-vehicle. Aujoulat notes, 
for instance, that Synesius used the terms phantasia, pneuma and ochema in 
reference to the soul-vehicle, but that all three concepts are intimately mixed 
and constitute one nature. Syn., De Insom. (Aujoulat 216).
126 “In short, it is a milieu between the irrational and the rational, the incorporeal 
and corporeal, of which it constitutes the common frontier. By its intermedi-
ary, divine things are in rapport with the elements that are totally opposed 
to it.” Syn., De Insom. 6.4 (Aujoulat 279). More generally, after having ex-
amined various accounts of the ochema-pneuma in Plato, Aristotle and their 
interpreters, Kissling concludes that the ochema-pneuma “was fundamentally 
connected with the functions of sense-perception and imagination.” Kissling, 
“The Oxhma-PNEUMA of the Neo-Platonists’ 320-21.
127 Aujoulat 216.
128 “The first soul borrows this imagination from the celestial spheres in the course 
of its descent, and mounted upon it as on a skiff, unites itself to the corporeal 
world.” Syn., De Insom. 7.4 (Aujoulat 281).
129 The imaginative pneuma is “une enveloppe qui revêt l’âme comme une gaine 
et la surface sur laquelle les images de la réalité se reflètent.” Lucia Suadelli, 
‘Un dit d’Héraclite dans le traité Sur les Songes de Synésios de Cyrène’ in 
Synesios von Kyrene: Politik – Literatur – Philosophie, eds H. Seng & L. 
Hoffmann (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013) 231-46, 233.
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Indeed, for Synesius the imaginative pneuma is the seat of the imagination 
(phantasia) and the organ of sense-perception and imagination whose 
surface reflects the images of reality.130 In Synesius’ words,
…the imagination is the sense of the senses, because the imaginative 
pneuma (phantastikon pneuma) is the most comprehensive sense 
and it constitutes the first body of the soul.131
More precisely, the imagination (phantasia) is the perfect sense as it 
gathers the other senses in it.132 The interaction of the soul with material 
realities is thus managed by the imaginative pneuma through the sensorial 
organs.133 These organs – the eyes, the ears, etc. – act as gatekeepers for 
the imaginative pneuma, sending sensible impressions from the exterior 
world to their master.134 
The imprinting of images onto the imaginative pneuma through 
the sensory organs can weigh a soul and its vehicle down, hindering the 
soul in its quest to rise again through the spheres. To counteract the effects 
of interaction with the material, that is, to purify the soul and its vehicle, 
Synesius recommends philosophy.135 Alongside the practice of philosophy, 
Synesius recommends the performance of good actions which improve the 
state of the soul and can etherealise the imaginative pneuma.136 Despite 
one’s best efforts however, the imaginative pneuma retains the imprints it 
receives during its sojourn into the material world. Quoting the Chaldean 
130 Finamore, Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul 1. Ilinca 
Tanaseanu-Döbler, Theurgy in Late Antiquity (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 2013) 165. Suadelli, ‘Un dit d’Héraclite’ 233.
131 Syn., De Insom. 5.2 (Aujoulat 277).
132 Syn., De Insom. 5.2 (Aujoulat 277). It should be noted that for Synesius the 
imaginative pneuma contains the phantasia and is somehow more material 
than it. Aujoulat 209.
133 Syn., De Insom. 5.2 (Aujoulat 277).
134 Syn., De Insom. 5.2 (Aujoulat 277).
135 Syn., De Insom. 10.4 (Aujoulat 287-88). Synesius also believes that philosophy 
was the best tool for preparing the pneuma to be used for dream divination as 
it calmed the passions. Syn., De Insom. 16.1 (Aujoulat 300).
136 Syn., De Insom. 6.3 (Aujoulat 279).
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Oracles, Synesius raises the possibility that these imprints or stains may 
remain on the soul-vehicle as it rises to the heavens: “And you will not 
leave behind the dregs of matter on a precipice, but there is also a portion 
for the image in the place surrounded with light.”137
We may better understand the ramifications of this oracle when we 
consider that the soul and its vehicle form a unity. It is only in the vehicle 
that the soul may pass from the celestial to terrestrial realm, and return 
there. Therefore, the images which mark the imaginative pneuma during 
its earthly journey come into a close relationship with the soul itself. When 
and if the soul-vehicle is etherealised through good works or philosophy, 
the images remain on the vehicle. When the soul and its vehicle return to 
the summit from which it came, the residue left on the vehicle is, in the 
words of Bregman, “converted to the “imagination” through the activity of 
the pneuma, and thus become “image” (eidolon) or spiritualised elements 
of the empirical personality.”138
It is in this process of conversion that we discover what may be a 
uniquely Synesian contribution to the theory of the soul-vehicle. While 
others claimed that the image was attacked by the pneuma, thereby 
annihilating the effects of material interaction, Synesius believed that “the 
pneuma actually becomes an eidolon.”139 The net result would therefore 
be that the soul and its vehicle, marked with all the stains incurred during 
the earthly life, would become a spiritualised body. Bregman is right to 
note that the Christian Platonist may have reasonably interpreted this 
spiritualised body to be equivalent to the Christian resurrected body.140 
Certainly there was no clear consensus regarding the details of Christian 
belief in the resurrection of the body among the early Fathers. There was, 
however, a firm belief among the majority of the Fathers that the resurrected 
body was composed of matter and spirit, and it is this fact that makes the 
137 Synesius, De insom. 9.1. Translation taken from Ruth Majercik, The Chaldean 
Oracles (Wiltshire, UK: The Prometheus Trust, 2013) Fragment 158 at 109.
138 Bregman, Synesius of Cyrene 150.
139 Bregman, Synesius of Cyrene 150.
140 Bregman, Synesius of Cyrene 151.
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doctrine of the ochema-pneuma a possible bridge between Neo-Platonism 
and Christianity on this point.141 
The doctrine of the soul-vehicle was not, however, fully compatible 
with Christianity. This was confirmed at the Council of Constantinople in 
553 where aspects of the doctrine of the soul-vehicle were condemned as 
Origenism.142 Having examined Synesius’ theory of the ochema-pneuma 
and the possibility that he had some belief in the resurrection of the body, 
it seems that one must conclude that Synesius did not have an orthodox 
belief in the resurrection of the body, even if, at the time, his view was 
not deemed unorthodox. Such a conclusion is consistent with Synesius’ 
insistence that the belief was “a sacred and mysterious conception.” 
The Pre-existence of the Soul
“I will never want to believe that the soul is born after the body.”143
What precisely is Synesius objecting to in this instance? The 
simple explanation is that Synesius is arguing for the pre-existence of 
souls, a well-known Neo-Platonic view with clear roots in the works of 
Plato himself.144 In fact, we could almost declare the case closed when we 
consider that Synesius considered the soul borrowed the ochema from the 
141 For a summary of the nuances in belief in the resurrected body among the 
fathers of the first five centuries, see J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines 
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1978) 463-79. Caroline Walker 
Bynum offers a comprehensive account in her book Resurrection of the Body 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
142 Wallis, Neoplatonism 104.
143 Ἀμέλει τὴν φυχὴν οὐκ ἀξιώσω ποτὲ σώματος ὑστερογενῆ νομίζειν.
144 An important example of Plato’s extrapolation of this belief can be seen in 
the dialogue between Cebes and Socrates in Phaedo wherein they discuss 
the theory of Recollection. This theory is founded on the premise that the 
soul pre-exists the body. Plato, Phaedo 72e-77a (Cooper 63-67). That this 
Platonic view persisted in Plotinian Neo-Platonism, see for example Frederick 
Copleston, A History of Philosophy – Volume One: Greece and Rome (New 
York: Doubleday, 1993) 468, and O’Brien’s commentary in Plotinus, The 
Essential Plotinus, translation and commentary by Elmer O’Brien (Indiana: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1964) 59-61.
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celestial spheres for its descent. While it is true that Synesius describes the 
soul as descending from the heavens before entering corporeal nature, he 
does not explicitly declare the pre-existence of the soul to be specifically a 
temporal or an ontological pre-existence. Although some argue that Plato 
– and later Plotinus – believed only in the ontological priority of the soul 
to the body and not in the chronological priority of the soul, the traditional 
reading of Plato is that he believed the soul was created earlier than the body 
in time.145 Returning to Synesius’ objection, if we re-frame the statement 
positively – I believe that the soul is created before, or at the same time 
as, the body – new intricacies of his view appear. Such a re-framing of 
his objection does not necessarily diminish the probability that Synesius 
believed in the pre-existence of the soul, but it does suggest that his position 
may have been closer to the Christian view than generally thought. 
The Fathers of the Church began discrediting the pagan doctrine 
of the pre-existence of the soul from at least as early as Justin Martyr. 
While Justin never explicitly explained the soul’s origin, he clearly stated 
that souls were begotten and could exist apart from the body; a position 
that stood in opposition to the Aristotelian view that the soul can only 
exist with the body.146 Justin also held that souls come into existence 
when God wills this and that “they were created for the sake of men and 
other living creatures.”147 Irenaeus developed a tri-partite anthropology of 
body-soul-spirit (trichotomism) which stressed the “indissoluble unity of 
145 De Vogel argues that Synesius’ first doctrinal objection has been misunderstood 
and is actually consistent with the orthodox position. For de Vogel, Synesius 
was merely in agreement with Plato and Plotinus, who he believes viewed 
the soul as ontologically, rather than temporally, prior to the body. De Vogel, 
‘Platonism and Christianity: A Mere Antagonism or a Profound Common 
Ground?’ 25. Reynolds, in seeking to prove that Plato did not believe in the 
temporal priority of the soul to the body, leaves open the possibility that the 
traditional reading is still valid. John Mark Reynolds, Towards a Unified Pla-
tonic Human Psychology (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 
Inc., 2004) 69-73.
146 L. W. Barnard, Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2008) 113.
147 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho VI.1 in Selections from the Fathers of 
the Church (Vol. 3), translated by T. B. Falls, revised by T. P. Halton, edited 
by M. Slusser (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 2003) 12. 
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body and soul” to which life is given through the working of the spirit.148 
Like Justin, Irenaeus too believed that the soul was created by God and 
continues in existence through an act of God’s will.149 Tertullian sharpened 
the doctrine on the soul, contending that “the soul did not pre-exist at all 
but was transmitted to the child through the semen of the father in the 
act of conception.”150 Ever the materialist, Tertullian diverged from the 
Platonist line, viewing the soul as “corporeal, having shape, simple in 
substance.”151 He believed that the soul has a corporal nature (corporalitas 
animae) and therefore had the normal characteristics of a body, such as 
location, confinement, and the threefold dimensions of length, breadth and 
height.152 Though he saw the soul as corporeal, Tertullian believed it to be 
immortal and “born of God’s breath,” though not “self-existent and divine” 
as Plato taught.153 According to Tertullian, soul was breathed into Adam 
in the beginning. Consequently, all of humanity shares in this original 
148 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Scandal of the Incarnation: Irenaeus against the 
Heresies, trans. by John Saward (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990) 94.
149 Irenaeus declares “all things that have been made have their beginning through 
being made, but they continue to exist as long as God wills them to do so.” 
Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 2.34.3 in Against the Heresies-Book 2, translated 
and annotated by D. J. Unger, revised by J. J. Dillon, introduction by M. 
Slusser (New York/Mahwah, N.J.: The Newman Press, 2012) 109. Waszink has 
identified a fragment in Syrian attributed to Irenaeus that shows he assumed 
the “simultaneous genesis of body and soul.” J. H. Waszink, Quinti Septimi 
Florentis Tertulliani De Anima (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010) 347.
150 McGuckin, ‘Soul’ in The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology (Lou-
isville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004) 318. Cum igitur in primordio 
duo diversa atque divisa, limus et flatus, unum hominem coegissent, confusae 
substantiae ambae iam in uno semina quoque sua miscuerunt atque exinde 
generi propagando formam tradiderunt, ut et nunc duo, licet diversa, etiam 
unita pariter effluant pariterque insinuata sulco et arvo suo pariter hominem 
ex utraque substantia effruticent, in quo rursus semen suum insit secundum 
genus, sicut omni condicioni genitali praestitutum est. Tertullian, De Anima 
27.8:12-19 in Waszink, Quinti Septimi Florentis Tertulliani De Anima 39 (= 
Tert., De Anima 27.8:12-19 (Waszink 39)).
151 Eric Osborn, The Beginning of Christian Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 100-1.
152 Tert., De Anima 7.1:5; 9.1:24-27, 9.5:24 (Waszink 9, 10, 11).
153 Osborn, The Beginning of Christian Philosophy 100-1.
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soul through the physical transmission of the seed of Adam. In the act of 
conception the father not only fertilises the egg to produce a new body, but 
he also ‘plants’ the ‘germ’ of Adam’s soul into the new person, wherein it 
becomes a new soul.154 Tertullian’s claim therefore, that the body and soul 
were created simultaneously at the moment of conception can thereby be 
reconciled with his belief that each individual soul shares in the soul of 
Adam.155 This last view156 (traducianism) was opposed to the creationist 
belief that the soul “was directly created by God at conception ... and put 
into the conceived embryo as God’s direct consecration of each life.”157 
Origen challenged the views of his Christian predecessors with 
his innovative hypotheses on creation. On his view, as it is laid out in his 
Peri archon, creation took place in two stages. The first was the creation 
of rational beings which are united to God through their own free will.158 
Following their creation, all bar one of these rational beings ‘fell’ from 
union with God to become angels, demons, other spiritual beings, and 
human souls. The one being that did not fall was “the human soul of the 
incarnate Christ.”159 Drawing on some rather dubious etymology, Origen 
posited that human souls (psuchai) are so called as their “once ardent love 
of God has “cooled” (psuchesthai).”160 This brings us to the second stage 
of creation, which was that of the material world. According to Origen, 
154 A primordio enim in Adam concreta et configurata corpori anima, ut totius 
substantiae, ita et condicionis istius semen effecit. Tert., De Anima 9.8.19-21 
(Waszink 12). Tertullian also adopts the analogy of the soul being like a new-
born sprout from the roots of Adam. Tert., De Anima 19.6.27-31 (Waszink 27).
155 Simulne conflata utriusque substantia corporis animaeque an altera earum 
praecedente? Immo simul ambas et concipi et confici, perfici dicimus, sicut 
et promi, nec ullum intervenire momentum in conceptu quo locus ordinetur. 
Tert., De Anima 27.1.14-18 (Waszink 38).
156 It is important to recognise that Tertullian’s belief that all souls were offshoots 
from the soul of Adam influenced Augustine as he tried to formulate his doc-
trine of original sin. Aspects of his theory remain problematic, particularly his 
belief in the materiality of the soul.
157 McGuckin, ‘Soul’ 318. 
158 Joseph W. Trigg, Origen (London and New York: Routledge, 2005) 26.
159 Trigg, Origen 26.
160 Trigg, Origen 26.
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the material world was created by God as a means by which to allow 
humanity to return to unity with God through “a process of moral and 
intellectual purification.”161 It is clear that this radical re-writing of creation 
theology, which drew together elements from the Scriptures, Stoicism, and 
Platonism, revitalised the pagan view that the soul pre-existed the body 
by giving it a pseudo-Christian dimension. Later, in an effort to refute 
Origen’s teaching on the pre-existence of souls the martyr bishop Methodius 
of Olympus seems to have contended that the soul was created after the 
body.162 In opposition to this view Bishop Nemesius of Emesa “goes close 
to embracing an Origenist view of the soul’s pre-existence.”163 Synesius 
and other Platonists would have found Methodius’ view difficult to accept 
as “the spiritual nature of man would appear to be in some way inferior to 
his corporeal nature,” a view previously criticised by Gregory of Nyssa.164
Having examined some major currents of thought regarding when 
the soul is created in relation to the creation of the body, it is now easier 
to judge Synesius’ view. Both the creationist and traducianist positions 
situate the creation of the soul at the point of conception, either through 
161 Trigg, Origen 26.
162 This is the view of Marrou. Henri Irénée Marrou, ‘Synesius of Cyrene and 
Alexandrian Neoplatonism’ in The Conflict Between Paganism and Chris-
tianity in the Fourth Century, ed. Arnaldo Momigliano (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1963) 126-50, 146. Methodius also opposed Tertullian’s traducianist 
position: “one would not be believed if he were to teach that the soul’s being, 
too, is sown together with the mortal body.” Methodius, Symposium 2.7 in The 
Symposium: A Treatise on Chastity, translated and annotated by H. Musurillo 
(New York, N.Y. and Ramsey, N.J.: Newman Press, 1958) 56. This passage 
should not be taken to suggest a belief in the pre-existence of souls. L. G. 
Patterson, Methodius of Olympus: Divine Sovereignty, Human Freedom, and 
Life in Christ (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 
1997) 138.
163 Frances M. Young, From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and 
its Background (London: SCM Press, 2010) 226. In contrast to Young, Marrou 
claims Nemesius “professed openly the doctrine of the pre-existence of the 
soul.” Furthermore, Marrou posits that the case of Nemesius is proof that the 
Church had not yet dogmatised teaching on this matter. Marrou, ‘Synesius of 
Cyrene and Alexandrian Neoplatonism’ 146.
164 Marrou, ‘Synesius of Cyrene and Alexandrian Neoplatonism’ 146 and 146 
n.3.
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the transmission of the ‘germ’ of the soul from the father, or through a 
direct act of God.165 The Neo-Platonist position is clear, that the soul 
pre-exists the body. Given Synesius’ training in a Neo-Platonist school 
and the proliferation of Hellenic influences in his works, it is more than 
reasonable that most commentators conclude that Synesius holds to a belief 
in the pre-existence of the soul. However, as we have seen, by re-framing 
his objection it is possible to claim that Synesius believed that the soul 
was created at the same time as the body, thus making his view perfectly 
acceptable for a Christian. Logic dictates however that Synesius would 
only make his view known if current Christian belief on the soul was 
that it was created after the body. While the animation of the body after 
conception was a belief held by Aristotle and the Stoics, it is not clear that 
this was a position held by Christians at the time. In sum, it seems that we 
must conclude with the majority of commentators that Synesius believed 
in the pre-existence of souls.
Theophilus on Synesius’ Objections
Let us now examine each of Synesius’ three doctrinal concerns to determine 
if they could have been viewed as Origenistic errors by Theophilus.
The Pre-existence of the Soul
Theophilus argued that Origen taught the pre-existence of souls.166 In this, 
Theophilus was well justified. Origen’s creation theology posited that 
165 For a contemporary view supporting the creation of the soul at the moment 
of conception, see Gregory of Nyssa in On the Soul and the Resurrection, 
where Macrina rules out the possibility of the soul being created after the 
body; “...no one with good sense would imagine that the origin of the souls is 
later and younger than the formation of the bodies, since everyone knows that 
none of the soulless beings has in itself the power of movement and growth. 
But there is no disagreement or doubt that those which are being nourished 
in the womb have growth and spatial movement.” Gregory of Nyssa, On the 
Soul and the Resurrection, trans. Catharine P. Roth (New York: St Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1993) 99-100. Note that Kelly sees in Gregory’s view a hint 
of traducianism. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines 345.
166 See for example, Theo., First Synodal Letter (= 1st Syn.) (Russell 92). De-
clerck has also identified relevant fragments from two documents written 
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intelligences (noes), or rational minds, were created before the existence of 
the material world. As we have mentioned previously, these intelligences 
later cooled to become souls, which afterwards were allocated material 
bodies. The claim that Origen believed in the pre-existence of souls must be 
nuanced by the fact that before souls became thus, they were intelligences. 
It was only after the fall that intelligences became souls and were then 
given bodies.167 The exception to this was one soul, which was to become 
the soul of Jesus, which certainly did not ‘cool’ due to falling away from 
God. Origen’s Christology, which was to prove problematic in later ages, 
saw this soul as pre-existently chosen by the divine Logos, waiting for 
the time of salvation.168 Theophilus knew Origen’s theory of the creation 
of souls and refuted it vigorously.169 In particular, he contested Origen’s 
Christological innovations, declaring of Christ, “that neither his flesh nor 
his soul existed before he was born of Mary, nor did a soul previously 
dwell in heaven which he subsequently united to himself.”170 
Despite the overwhelming proof that the pre-existence of souls was 
rightly seen by Theophilus as an error in Origen’s theology, it is not possible 
to attribute Synesius’ probable belief in the pre-existence of souls to the 
influence of Origen rather than Neo-Platonism. However, if Synesius really 
believed in the pre-existence of souls, as we have previously determined 
was likely, Theophilus could have seen this as an Origenistic error even 
if Synesius’ view was inspired by Neo-Platonism or some other source. 
after the condemnation of Origen’s work which, he argues persuasively, were 
either written by Theophilus or on behalf of him. José Declerck, ‘Théophile 
d’Alexandrie contre Origène: Nouveaux Fragments de L’Epistula Synodalis 
Prima (CPG, 2595)’ Byzantion 54 (1984) 495-507, 507.
167 Theophilus discovered this heretical view in Origen’s writings: “What prophet 
has taught him to think that God was compelled to create bodies on account 
of souls falling from heaven?” Theo., 17th Fest. (Russell 125).
168 id est anima uerbo dei Christus efficitur. Orig., De princ. 2.6.4: 140-41 (Crouzel 
316). Charles Kannengiesser, ‘Christology’ in The SCM Press A-Z of Origen, 
ed. J. A. McGuckin (London: SCM Press, 2006) 76.
169 For a particularly clear and forceful explanation and refutation of Origen’s 
theory of intelligences, souls and bodies see Theo., 17th Fest. 15 (Russell 129-
30).
170 Theo., 17th Fest. 8 (Russell 124).
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The Creation and Destruction of the World
Origen’s account of creation was compatible with the doctrine of creatio 
ex nihilo. In his Commentary on John, contrasting his belief with that of 
the Aristotelians and Neo-Platonists, Origen declared that “God has created 
beings from non-being.”171 Furthermore, Origen affirmed a beginning for 
the world while denying it would have an end.172 It seems that Theophilus 
did not take exception to this aspect of Origen’s view that God created 
from nothing. Theophilus was more concerned with Origen’s claim that 
God created only as many rational creatures as he could govern and the 
logical consequences of such a position.173 Countering Origen, Theophilus 
posited that God created only as much as was necessary and that He is 
not limited by “measure and number.”174 While this may not be a just 
interpretation of Origen’s De principiis 2.9.1, Theophilus nevertheless 
concluded that Origen believed that God is not omnipotent. Additionally, 
Theophilus accuses Origen of “claiming that God was limited by the 
material (materia) available to him for the execution of his work.”175 One 
171 ὅτι ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τὰ ὄντα ἐποίησεν ὁ θεός. Origen, Commentary on John, Book 1 
103 in Origène, Commentaire Sur S. Jean – Tome I, Greek text established and 
translated into French by Cécile Blanc (Paris: Cerf, 1966) 114. Tzamalikos 
identifies two keys to understanding Origen’s creation theology: first, creation 
is an act of providence whereby all potentialities come into existence from 
non-being; and second, fallen and spatio-temporally limited creation actually 
becomes outside of God. P. Tzamalikos, Origen: Philosophy of History & 
Eschatology (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007) 337. 
172 Origen’s unwillingness to believe the world can come to an end is based on 
his doctrine of apokatastasis, which has its roots in Acts 3:21, where Peter 
preaches a universal restoration, and 1 Cor 15:21-28, which explains that in 
the end times God will be all in all. Apokatastasis is the eschatological goal of 
“becoming into God” whereby all of creation will be restored in and returned 
into God. Tzamalikos, Origen: Philosophy of History & Eschatology 331, 338. 
173 Theo., 17th Fest. 17-18 (Russell 131-33). See Orig., De princ. 9.1:1-30 (Crouzel 
352-55) which is clearly the source of Theophilus’ objection. 
174 Theo., 17th Fest. 17 (Russell 132).
175 Note that the ambiguity is due to the absence of the original Greek text. We 
are left with the Latin; quod tantum possit deus, quantum ei ad operandum 
materia ministrarit. Hieronymus, Epistle XCVIII, Corpus Scriptorum Eccle-
siasticorum Latinorum 55, ed. I. Hilberg (Vindobonae - Lipsiae: F. Tempsky 
and G. Freytag, 1912) 203. Theo., 17th Fest. 18 (Russell 133).
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could perhaps see this as an accusation against Origen of not holding to 
creatio ex nihilo. Given the original Greek text has been lost it is only 
possible to speculate on what Theophilus was really accusing Origen of 
believing. Putting the sentence in context, we see that Theophilus reproves 
Origen for not recognising that the nature of created things and the nature of 
the creator are different.176 Furthermore, Theophilus points out that matter 
– that “from which something comes into being” – cannot be as great as 
the creator – “he who makes something from it.”177 The context suggests 
that Theophilus is accusing Origen of ascribing to the nature of God 
limits which are appropriate to creatures, not to the creator. Nevertheless, 
Theophilus’ accusation that Origen believed God to be limited by materia 
is curious and cannot be dismissed so simply. Further investigation into 
this question must wait for another occasion.
Returning to the case in point, Theophilus was not concerned with 
Origen’s views on the destruction of the world. Furthermore, Theophilus 
did not critique Origen’s beliefs on creatio ex nihilo, which aside from 
the curiosity mentioned in the Seventeenth Festal Letter, seem to have 
been orthodox. Given, (a) the ambiguity we have identified in knowing 
precisely whether Synesius’ view on the creation and destruction of the 
world would have been seen as heterodoxy in his day, and (b) the lack of 
evidence of heterodoxy with regard to Origen’s beliefs on these issues, it is 
not possible to describe Synesius’ second doctrinal objection as something 
Theophilus should have seen as an Origenistic heresy.
The Resurrection of the Body
In his Second Synodal Letter to the Bishops of Palestine and Cyprus, 
which Russell dates to the autumn of 400, Theophilus claims that Origen 
taught that 
…after the passage of many centuries our bodies will gradually 
be reduced to nothing and will dissolve into thin air, and, in case 
176 Theo., 17th Fest. 18 (Russell 133).
177 Theo., 17th Fest. 18 (Russell 133).
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we should think this is a small matter, adding that ‘the resurrected 
body will not only be corruptible but also mortal.’178
Trigg identifies two stages in Origen’s De principiis through which the 
soul must pass in its return to God.179 Firstly, souls “must first of all 
remain in bodies which are more subtle and more pure.”180 Secondly, 
“the material nature diminishes progressively, death will be absorbed 
and finally destroyed and its sting will be completely dulled by the divine 
grace of which the soul has become capable of receiving, meriting to 
obtain incorruption and immortality.”181 According to Trigg, it is likely 
that Origen did not change his opinion on these matters given that they 
are echoed in works written much later in his life.182 
Like Synesius after him, a key element of Origen’s views on the 
resurrected body was his adoption of the Platonic ochema. Origen identified 
the ochema both with the Pauline σῶμα πνευματικόν183 and angelic bodies.184 
Blosser believes Origen used the ochema to emphasise the corporeality of 
the soul.185 This, however, does not explain Origen’s view that incorporeal 
life is “the privilege of the Trinity alone.”186 Origen therefore required the 
ochema to fulfil the role of embodying the immaterial soul both prior to 
earthly life, and between death and the resurrection. Indeed, in the words 
of Crouzel and Simonetti, the translators of De principiis, for Origen “est 
178 Theo., 2nd Syn. 2 (Russell 94-95). This theme is repeated again in Theo., 16th 
Fest. 13 (Russell 110-11).
179 Trigg, Origen 32.
180 Orig., De princ. 2.3.3:111-12 (Crouzel 256).
181 Orig., De princ. 2.3.3:113-18 (Crouzel 256).
182 Trigg, Origen 32.
183 “It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a physical 
body, there is also a spiritual body.” 1 Cor 15:44 (NRSV).
184 B. P. Blosser, Become Like the Angels: Origen’s Doctrine of the Soul (Wash-
ington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012) 252-53.
185 Blosser, Become Like the Angels 253.
186 solius namque trinitatis incorporea uita existere recte putabitur. Orig., De princ. 
2.2.2:31-32 (Crouzel 248).
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impossible d’imaginer qu’une créature puisse vivre sans corps.”187 For 
Origen the ochema was the soul’s glorious and luminous body, which 
enveloped it even up to the “final restoration of all things into God.”188 
Consequently, in response to Blosser it is more accurate to state that 
Origen recognised the immateriality of the soul, but needed the ochema to 
account for the very possibility of bodily resurrection and the continuity 
of bodily form, both before and after terrestrial life. One must question 
though, as with Synesius’ version of the theory, how Origen’s ochema is 
corporeal in any real sense. Indeed Brian E. Daley notes that Origen was 
widely criticised, perhaps unfairly, for making the resurrected body so 
spiritualised that it lacked any real corporeality.189 
Returning to Theophilus’ interpretation of Origen’s writings on 
the resurrection of the body, it is apparent that Theophilus has faithfully 
represented Origen’s assertion that bodies will disappear. As a consequence 
he is right to say that for Origen the body is corruptible as the material 
nature disappears. Furthermore, as the body will one day cease to exist, 
Theophilus is correct to conclude that Origen believed the resurrected 
body to be mortal. It is curious, however, that Theophilus did not pick up 
on Origen’s theory of the ochema if indeed it was seen as an unorthodox 
addendum to contemporary Christian pneumatology. Additionally, 
Theophilus’ assertion that Origen believed resurrected bodies to be 
spherical190 – a theory posited by Plato in the Timaeus191 – seems to indicate 
that Theophilus was not just in his analysis of Origen’s views on the 
187 Origène, Traité des Principes – Tome II, ed. Henri Crouzel and Manilo Sim-
onetti (Paris: Cerf, 1978) 141.
188 Blosser, Become Like the Angels 254.
189 Brian E. Daley, ‘Resurrection’ in The SCM Press A-Z of Origen 184.
190 In a letter written in Constantinople in 403, Theophilus accuses Origen of 
believing that “resurrected bodies were spherical in shape.” Theo., Const. 8 
(Russell 142). 
191 The argument for this is that the resurrected body should take the perfect 
shape; the perfect shape is the sphere; therefore, the resurrected body should 
be spherical. For a comprehensive explanation of why the spherical form was 
deemed the most perfect for Platonists, see Thomas Taylor’s translation of 
Proclus’ commentaries on Plato’s Timaeus. Thomas Taylor, The Commentaries 
Of Proclus On The Timaeus Of Plato (London: The author, 1820) 445-47. 
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resurrected body.192 Indeed modern scholarship has concluded that there is 
little compelling evidence to support Theophilus’ claim on this matter.193 
Having briefly dissected Theophilus’ perceptions of Origen’s theories 
regarding the resurrected body, it can be concluded that for the most part 
Theophilus has been fair. He has, however, misrepresented Origen’s views 
on the resurrected body being spherical and he should have investigated 
Origen’s theory of the ochema more fully.
Synesius’ actual objections to what he believed to be orthodox 
views of the doctrine of the resurrection are clouded in ambiguity. Given 
it cannot be assumed that Theophilus had read De insomniis – in which 
Synesius lays out his own developments on the theory of the ochema-
pneuma – we must conclude that Theophilus could not have been expected 
to form an accurate judgement of Synesius’ position on the resurrection. 
If, however, Theophilus did read De insomniis and if he had understood 
the implications of Origen’s theory of the ochema, then it is clear that he 
should have objected to Synesius’ views on the ochema-pneuma because 
(a) they are a key element of Synesius’ beliefs regarding the resurrected 
body, and (b) they are similar to those held by Origen. We should note 
that, regardless of what Theophilus actually knew of Synesius’ opinions 
on the resurrection of the body, it is possible that he appreciated Synesius’ 
preference to mythologise on the topic with the masses.
Concluding Remarks
We must now consider how it was possible for Theophilus to ordain 
Synesius, given the patriarch’s well-known desire to combat paganism and 
heterodox views, and the Cyrenian’s public admission of disagreements 
with doctrinal points. We have determined that Synesius probably believed 
in the pre-existence of souls. Furthermore, we have found that Theophilus 
should have seen this as either an Origenistic error or a sign of Synesius’ 
192 Theophilus’ response to the theory that the resurrected body is spherical was 
“that for each body its own body is best.” Theo., Const. 8 (Russell 142).
193 For example, Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines 472; Alois Grillmeier and 
Theresia Hainthaler, Christ in Christian Tradition – Vol 2, trans. by Pauline 
Allen and John Cawte (London: Mowbray; Louisville, KY: WJK, 1995) 397. 
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paganism. Regarding Synesius’ beliefs concerning the annihilation of the 
world and its parts and the associated question of the creation of the world 
ex nihilo, we have shown that one cannot convincingly prove that Synesius’ 
opinion was heterodox at the time or that Theophilus should have seen this 
as a heresy of Origen. Finally, Synesius’ rather ambiguous difference of 
opinion to the masses concerning the Resurrection and the likelihood that 
Theophilus was not exposed to Synesius’ philosophical musings on the 
topic, leads us to conclude that Theophilus could not have been expected to 
have regarded Synesius’ beliefs in this matter to be Origenistic. Certainly 
Synesius’ opinions on the matter could not have been pagan as the idea 
of a bodily resurrection was abhorrent to the Neo-Platonists. All things 
considered, the collective weight of Synesius’ doctrinal objections should 
have provoked Theophilus to question the legitimacy of consecrating him.
History has tended to regard Theophilus as being scheming and 
calculating. In this paper we have sought to clarify Synesius’ doctrinal 
objections to ordination in order to see if he displayed an affinity with 
paganism, anthropomorphism or Origenism, thus confirming or denying 
the view that Theophilus was duplicitous. It remains rather plausible 
that history has remembered Theophilus correctly as one who put power 
before orthodoxy; that is Theophilus knew of Synesius’ unorthodoxy yet 
ordained him anyway in order to shore up his power base in the Pentapolis. 
Indeed Theophilus may have believed that it was worthwhile to concede 
to Synesius’ demands, knowing that Synesius would fight for the most 
important doctrines and would be able to use his political connections to 
help Theophilus maintain power in the Pentapolis. Further to this, as we 
see in Epistle 105, Synesius could be relied upon by Theophilus to keep 
his heterodox opinions to himself; 
I have, for my part, the taste of speculation, and outside, in doctrine, 
the taste of speaking in fables, without modifying the doctrine and 
in leaving each one to stick to his previous notions.194 
This declaration could very well have satisfied Theophilus that he would 
not face a further threat to orthodoxy from the Pentapolis. Consequently, 
194 Syn., Ep. 105.101-4 (Roques 239).
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Russell’s claim that Theophilus ordained Synesius on the proviso that 
he remains silent on his heterodox opinions is surely correct and is the 
most likely reason why Theophilus ordained Synesius. Not only does this 
scenario allow for the fact that Synesius was not orthodox in his views – 
which seems very likely from our investigation into his objections – but 
it also recognises that Theophilus was aware of the dangers of ordaining 
Synesius, but was shrewd enough to see that Synesius could be a good 
and faithful servant, even if he was not orthodox in all areas of Christian 
doctrine. 
In summary, we have shown that it is highly probable that Synesius 
was not orthodox according to modern benchmarks in his understanding 
of the soul, the creation of the world, and the resurrection of the body. 
Furthermore we have seen that the collective weight of Synesius’ objections 
should have caused Theophilus concern as they reflect the influence of 
paganism and had some parallels in notions found in Origen’s works. 
Finally, we can declare that the most plausible reason for Theophilus 
choosing to ordain Synesius is that the patriarch knew of Synesius’ 
objections, but saw that he could be more useful than detrimental in the 
fight to maintain orthodoxy in the Pentapolis. 
